Social License to Regulate: Consumer-Producer Collusion and Related Policy Risks for Consumer-Facing Regulation by Richardson, Nathan
University of Cincinnati Law Review 
Volume 86 Issue 1 Article 5 
October 2018 
Social License to Regulate: Consumer-Producer Collusion and 
Related Policy Risks for Consumer-Facing Regulation 
Nathan Richardson 
richarnd@law.sc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr 
Recommended Citation 
Nathan Richardson, Social License to Regulate: Consumer-Producer Collusion and Related Policy Risks 
for Consumer-Facing Regulation, 86 U. Cin. L. Rev. 153 (2018) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and 
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact 
ronald.jones@uc.edu. 
153 
SOCIAL LICENSE TO REGULATE:  
CONSUMER-PRODUCER COLLUSION AND RELATED POLICY 
RISKS FOR CONSUMER-FACING REGULATION 
Nathan Richardson* 
Abstract 
Used a gas can recently? If not, prepare for a 
surprise—they’ve become harder to use due to 
government-mandated design changes aimed at 
reducing air pollution. Faced with persistent 
environmental and other challenges, government 
regulators have increasingly turned to similar 
regulations on consumer products. But these 
consumer-facing regulations create new policy and 
political problems for regulators, different from 
those associated with traditional industry-facing 
regulation. This paper looks in depth at three case 
studies of consumer-facing regulation: emissions 
controls on gas cans, efficiency standards for light 
bulbs, and European vehicle fuel economy 
standards. In each case, there is strong evidence 
for widespread evasion of the regulations by 
consumers and by consumers and producers 
working together. This evasion may substantially 
undercut the targeted benefits of the regulations. 
Moreover, consumer dissatisfaction with the 
regulations appears common, perhaps indicating 
underappreciated costs to consumers and playing 
in to anti-regulatory narratives. Building on these 
case studies, this paper explores options available 
to regulators for reducing incentives and 
opportunities to evade consumer-facing regulation 
and for anticipating or reducing consumer 
dissatisfaction. Such options include externality 
pricing, stricter (and smarter) enforcement, careful 
selection of regulatory targets, modifications to ex-
ante cost-benefit analysis, and, in some cases, 
 
* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. 
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eschewing regulation entirely in favor of providing 
information or other less-intrusive policies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When was the last time you used a gasoline can? If it was more than a 
few years ago, or more recently but the can you used was more than a 
few years old, the experience was likely simple and straightforward. 
Open the spout; open a vent at the back of the can so a vacuum does not 
2
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form; and pour away. This simple design has been used in gas 
containers for decades, and for liquid containers of all types for far 
longer. But if you use a gas can sold in the US today, you will likely 
have a much more frustrating experience. New cans have no vents and 
usually require two-handed operation of a relatively complex (usually 
spring-loaded) spout mechanism. They take longer to pour and have a 
learning curve—it is quite likely that you will pour nothing at all and/or 
spill some gasoline until you get the hang of it.  
Why the design change? Why fix something that is not obviously 
broken? The answer is that the new designs do have an important 
advantage (or, conversely, that the old design was in a sense broken) in 
a way that is not immediately apparent. Moreover, the changes are only 
partially for your (the gas can user’s) benefit. The key advantage is that 
new cans lose much less gasoline to evaporation (at least assuming you 
do not spill while pouring). With no vents to leave open and auto-
closing spouts, you will never come to find that the contents of a can 
you have not used in months and absentmindedly left open have 
evaporated. Moreover, you and everyone in your area will breathe a 
little easier—evaporating gasoline releases volatile organic carbons 
(VOCs) (including benzene) and other pollutants1 that can cause or 
exacerbate serious health problems.2 
Environmental regulators, recognizing this opportunity to reduce 
emissions, have mandated that new gas cans meet standards that 
effectively ban old-style vented cans, first in California and later at the 
federal level.3 These regulators have concluded that the public health 
benefits of the new cans outweigh their increased sticker price and 
added frustration. They may be correct. But if you are tempted to just 
keep your old can, buy one at a garage sale, or even take a drill to a new 
can to (damn the regulators) add the vent that God intended a gas can to 
have—you are not alone. These and other creative methods of 
regulatory evasion, some in concert with manufacturers, have become 
common. So too has popular backlash against the regulations, at least 
among those who use gas cans frequently, likely contributing to loss of 
confidence in environmental regulators specifically and possibly 
 
 1. See Assessment and Standards Division, Office of Transportation and Air Quality, EPA, 
Estimating Emissions Associated with Portable Fuel Containers (PFCs) at 1 (2007), 
http://goo.gl/hrQxpN (estimating pollutant emissions from PFCs). 
 2. See also Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources, 72 Fed. Reg. 8428, 
8428-8430 (Feb. 26, 2007) [hereinafter “EPA PFC Rule”] (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 59, subpt. F) (noting 
that “benzene is a known human carcinogen” and that VOCs are “precursors to ozone and PM2.5”, both 
of which are regulated under National Ambient Air Quality Standards). 
 3. See Regulations: Portable Fuel Containers and Spouts, Final Regulation Order (2000), 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/spillcon/finalreg.pdf (initial gas can emissions rules for California) 
[hereinafter “1999 CARB PFC Rule”]; see also EPA PFC Rule, supra note 2.  
3
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government generally. Moreover, regulators appear not to have 
adequately considered the degree of creative regulatory evasion or 
political pushback when they decided to regulate can design. This story 
of the gas can’s regulatory undoing is one example of a wider 
phenomenon of evasion and backlash against consumer-facing 
regulations. 
Most regulatory laws, including but not limited to environmental 
laws, are generally understood as restricting the ability of a small group 
of relatively powerful actors to do things (pollution, overexploitation of 
resources, marketing of unsafe drugs, etc.) that harm the general 
welfare. Put in economic terms, regulation limits the ability of 
producing firms to impose external costs on consumers/everyone, at 
least in principle. Or in colloquial terms, regulations keep the big guys 
from hurting everyone else (perhaps especially from hurting the little 
guys). Of course, regulations may or may not be effective in practice. 
They impose costs on the firms, industries, and activities to which they 
apply, and these costs are eventually passed on to consumers. 
Regulations also have administrative costs paid for by tax revenues. If 
these costs together are greater than the benefits of the regulation, then it 
has failed—the cure is worse than the disease. As some economists and 
regulators (and all environmental justice advocates) note, distributional 
impacts of a regulation should also be considered in judging its 
effectiveness.  
While this abstract model of regulation works well in many contexts, 
it is incomplete and sometimes inaccurate. Not all regulation applies to 
large producing firms, and not all costs imposed on consumers or the 
general public come in the form of higher prices for goods and services. 
Sometimes regulations apply to consumers directly, by restricting 
consumer choice, or indirectly, by making the products consumers use 
work less well for their intended purpose.  
These direct effects on consumers do not mean that such regulations 
are not justified—benefits may still exceed costs, sometimes greatly. 
However, the politics and policy analyses are different. Under the 
“classical” view of regulation, regulated firms may oppose regulation ex 
ante or try to evade compliance ex post, but the general consuming 
public is the beneficiary of that regulation and will support it, at least so 
long as the public believes that the benefits they receive exceed the costs 
passed on to them. This analysis changes, however, when regulations 
impose private costs directly on consumers. Consumers who cannot buy 
the product they want because regulation has banned its sale, or who 
find that regulated products perform poorly in comparison to the 
unregulated products they used in the past, face private costs that may 
feel more real and immediate than increased costs passed on by 
4
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regulated firms do. Cost-benefit analysis of regulations may also fail to 
fully account for relatively hard-to-measure lost consumer welfare due 
to reduced choice or lower performance, making regulations seem more 
beneficial on net than they really are.  
These effects may lead consumers themselves to attempt to avoid 
regulations, behaving more like regulated producers. Opposition to 
regulation may increase, undercutting regulators’ “social license to 
regulate.” Consumers and producers may even collude to avoid 
regulation, capturing and dividing private benefits at the cost of greater 
externalities imposed on the general public. In other words, both 
political support and practical effectiveness of regulation may drop. 
Policymakers should be aware of these risks and account for them in 
regulatory design (and in decisions regarding whether to regulate at all). 
To be clear, attempts to evade regulation are neither new nor limited 
to the consumer-facing regulation discussed here. Because the 
distribution of costs and benefits from any regulation will not be 
uniform, it is possible, and indeed likely, that some groups or 
individuals will oppose regulations that (at least ostensibly) enhance 
social welfare but which they feel impose excessive private costs on 
them. This opposition may come in the form of lobbying or other rent-
seeking behavior, or regulated parties may take matters into their own 
hands and attempt to evade the regulations (or, more pejoratively and 
precisely, to cheat).  
This paper examines three case studies of consumer regulatory 
evasion, some of which appear to involve collusion between producers 
and consumers. As the case studies and subsequent discussion illustrate, 
evasion appears more frequent in the consumer context. This evasion 
can be significant—in one of the three case studies, it appears that as 
much as 65% of ostensible benefits of the regulation were never realized 
due to evasion.4 Moreover, consumer-facing regulation appears to 
generate much greater consumer discontent than regulation that merely 
increases costs, even though those costs are eventually passed on to 
consumers. 
These case studies therefore suggest that regulators should more 
honestly and deeply consider the additional administrative, economic, 
and political costs of consumer-facing regulation. Discussion after the 
case studies suggests a number of possible regulatory responses. 
 
 4. See Mathias Reynaert and James M. Sallee, Self Regulation, Corrective Policy, and 
Goodhart’s Law: The Case of Carbon Emissions From Automobiles 3 (NBER, Working Paper No. 
22911, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22911.pdf [hereinafter Reynaert & Sallee]. 
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II. REGULATING GAS CAN EMISSIONS 
Millions of Americans use portable gasoline cans to store spare fuel 
for cars, boats, yard tools, generators, and other vehicles and devices. 
The (usually red) gas can has been a fixture of American households for 
over a century—everyone has seen one, many households have one, and 
some have many. While designs varied, from the iconic rectangular 
military-spec “jerry can” to the common round steel container found in 
many garages, their basic function was similar. Most cans were sealed 
with two caps, one large and one small, and pouring fuel required 
opening both. Remove the larger cap and screw on a spout, then open 
the small cap and pour. The small cap allows air to enter the can as fuel 
is poured out, preventing uneven pours and spills (see Figure 1). If you 
have never used a gas can, imagine pouring a milk or water jug into the 
sink. You are likely to get a sloppy, gurgling pour—that is, unless you 
poke a small hole in the bottom of the jug before pouring. Doing so 
allows air pressure to equalize behind the liquid being poured from the 






















Figure 1: Pre-regulation gas cans. Note primary opening for attaching spout 
and secondary (open) vent.5 
 
 5. Image source: Washington & Jefferson College Culturally Authentic Pictorial Lexicon (CC-
noncommercial license). 
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This basic design worked quite well, though it did have flaws. 
Inexperienced users could spill gas when pouring, for example by not 
securely attaching the spout or failing to open the vent. If either cap was 
left off when the can was stored, gasoline would evaporate at a 
surprisingly rapid rate.6 Some materials used for cans were also 
permeable to gasoline vapors over time.7 All of these potential problems 
have obvious negative effects on those who buy and use the cans. 
Spilling gasoline or allowing it to evaporate is wasteful, and spills of 
such a highly flammable liquid can create a major safety hazard. 
A. The Gas Can Emissions Problem and Regulatory Response 
The negative effects of gasoline spills and evaporation are not limited 
to the consumers/users of gas cans, however. Evaporating gasoline is a 
significant air pollutant. When gasoline evaporates, it contributes VOCs 
to the air, including toluene, butane, and benzene.8 Some of these 
compounds, such as benzene, are themselves toxic.9 VOCs also 
contribute to formation of tropospheric ozone and fine particulate matter 
(PM 2.5), both of which have significant negative health effects.10 Both 
ozone and PM 2.5 are regulated under the Clean Air Act as “criteria” 
pollutants subject to national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS),11 
which states are required to meet under the Clean Air Act.12 
Atmospheric VOCs, ozone, and PM 2.5 levels depend on emissions 
from a variety of sources, including vehicle tailpipes and industrial 
processes,13 among which evaporating gasoline is a small but not trivial 
contributor.14 Spilled gasoline can also contaminate ground and surface 
water. In economic terms, therefore, spills and evaporation from gas 
cans impose both a private cost to can users (wasted gasoline) and a 
 
 6. See Estimating Emissions Associated with Portable Fuel Containers, supra note 1 at 11 
(noting that CARB research estimated that 49% of PFCs in commercial use and 34% of those in 
residential use were stored in the “open” position). 
 7. See id. at 6 (estimating permeation rates for plastic and metal PFCs). 
 8. See id. See also Jo-Yu Chin and Stuart A. Batterman, VOC composition of current motor 
vehicle fuels and vapors, and collinearity analyses for receptor modeling, 86 CHEMOSPHERE 951 (2012) 
(detailing VOC composition of retail gasoline).  
 9. See EPA PFC Rule, supra note 2 at 8428 (noting that “benzene is a known human 
carcinogen”). 
 10. See id. at 8430. 
 11. Id. 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2006). 
 13. See EPA, Report on the Environment, Volatile Organic Compounds Emissions, available at 
https://cfpub.epa.gov/roe/indicator.cfm?i=23 (describing VOCs as precursor of ozone and PM 
emissions). 
 14. See Estimating Emissions Associated with Portable Fuel Containers, supra note 1 at 10 
(estimating 327,000 tons of hydrocarbon emissions from PFCs in 2005). 
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public cost or negative externality to everyone in the area (air pollution). 
Gas cans, as consumer products, have long been subject to some level 
of regulation. For example, many states require gas cans to be red for 
safety reasons.15 But until recently the basic design of gas cans was not a 
subject of any significant regulation. Beginning in 1999, however, 
regulators began to take interest in gas cans (portable fuel containers, or 
PFCs in regulatory parlance) because of the contribution of gasoline 
evaporation to air pollution.16 The California Air Resources Board 
(CARB) imposed the first of such regulations in the form of design 
restrictions on new gas cans manufactured or sold within the state 
starting in 2001.17 These regulations required that new cans be made of 
non-permeable materials, include redesigned spouts with automatic 




















Figure 2: CARB/EPA compliant gas can. Note auto-closing spout and lack of 
separate rear vent.19 
 
 15. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 168.11(2)(2015) (requiring all gasoline containers to be “substantially 
a bright red color”). 
 16. See M. Nguyen, California Air Resources Board, Source Inventory Category #1434: 
Portable Fuel Container Spillage, Base Year 1999 (1999), 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/ei/areasrc/districtmeth/BayArea/C1434.pdf (study identifying portable fuel 
containers as significant source of evaporative emissions). 
 17. See 1999 CARB PFC Rule, supra note 3. 
 18. See California Air Resources Board, Regulations for Portable Fuel Containers (PFC) and 
Spouts (August 16, 2010), https://www.arb.ca.gov/consprod/fuel-containers/pfc/facts/sep99_facts.htm.  
 19. Image source: author. 
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The rules aimed to reduce VOC emissions from both fundamental 
design characteristics of cans (permeability) and from user carelessness 
(leaving caps or spouts open).20 Estimated emissions reductions from the 
rule were “over 68 tons per day” of reactive organic gases (ROGs), a 
somewhat narrower category of pollutants than VOCs.21 These 
regulations were updated and revised in 2006.22 
It is not surprising that California was the first state to impose 
emissions-driven regulations on gas cans. Historically it has been a 
leader among states in setting new environmental rules, and it has 
struggled for decades to meet the NAAQS in areas throughout the state, 
most notably the Central Valley and Los Angeles Basin.23 Other states 
followed California’s lead, however, largely in an effort to meet the 
ozone NAAQS, which have persistently proved difficult in a number of 
major cities.24 New York, for example, imposed gas can regulations 
similar to California’s in 2003, which it estimated would lead to 50 tons 
per day in VOC emissions reductions, along with other benefits from 
reduction in ground and surface water contamination.25 In 2007, the 
federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adopted gas can 
regulations under Section 183(e) of the Clean Air Act.26 Although 
differing from California’s 1999 approach in important ways discussed 
below, these rules effectively imposed the same requirements 
nationally.27 The sale and manufacture of old-style gas cans was banned, 
in favor of new models featuring low-permeability materials and 
automatically-closing spouts, and lacking vents.28 
 
 20. See California Air Resources Board, Updated Informative Digest, Adoption of Portable Fuel 
Container Spillage Control Regulations at 1 (1999), https://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/spillcon/gasinf.pdf. 
 21. Id. at 5. 
 22. California Air Resources Board, Final Regulation Order: Portable Fuel Container 
Regulation (2006), (amending 13 Cal Code of Reg §2467 et seq), 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/pfc/2005/frorev2.pdf.  
 23. See California Air Resources Board, Federal Standard Area Designations, 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/desig/feddesig.htm (noting designation of a number of California counties as 
nonattainment areas for ozone, PM2.5, and other NAAQS pollutants).  
 24. See EPA, 8-Hour Ozone (2008) Nonattainment Areas, 
https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/hnc.html (noting designation of Los Angeles and the San 
Joaquin Valley as “extreme” nonattainment areas for ozone, other California areas as “severe”, and 
cities including Baltimore, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Houston, New York, and Phoenix as “moderate”).  
 25. See New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Portable Fuel Container 
Fact Sheet, https://web.archive.org/web/20170324054635/http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/8579.html.  
 26. EPA PFC Rule, supra at 8499. 
 27. See id. at 8432 (“[t]he revised California program is very similar to the program we are 
finalizing”). 
 28. See id. at 8500 (describing requirements of the EPA standards). As discussed below, the EPA 
regulations are performance standards, so they do not require specific vent or spout designs. In practice, 
however, auto-closing spouts are required and vents are forbidden, the latter because testing procedures 
assume they will be left open. 
9
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CARB and EPA analysis indicated that these regulations were cost-
benefit justified, with benefits of emissions reduction exceeding costs of 
new cans imposed on manufacturers and consumers.29 The regulations 
also achieved VOC emissions reductions at a lower cost-per-ton than 
alternative measures.30 
B. Consumer Reactions 
At first blush, these regulations would seem good for everyone: users 
of gas cans benefit from reduced spills and evaporative losses, while the 
public at large benefits from improved air quality. In reality, however, 
the regulations have generated significant consumer dissatisfaction. 
New-style cans are more expensive—in its 1999 revised regulations 
California estimated an increased cost of $6-11 per can.31 The new style 
gas cans are also more difficult to operate, often requiring two hands,32 
and may have lower pour rates, taking longer to fill tanks from a can.33 
The additional complexity involved in operating spouts on the new cans 
is a source of consumer frustration and, anecdotal evidence suggests, 
more (rather than less) spilling of gasoline for some users. To give a few 
examples of consumer views on these new cans: 
 
If you’ve had the pleasure of buying a gas can in the past few 
years, then you’ve likely come to the conclusion that all modern 
gas cans suck. . . the actual implementation of these regulations has 
 
 29. See id. at 8430-8431 (estimating benefits substantially exceeding costs). See also California 
Air Resources Board, Updated Informative Digest: Amendments to the Regulations for Portable Fuel 
Containers at 2 (2006), https://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/pfc/2005/pfcuid.pdf (noting that “[t]he ARB staff 
determined that adopting the proposal is technologically feasible, cost-effective, and provides the 
greatest benefits to the people of California”). 
 30. See id. at 8511(estimating costs per ton of hydrocarbon and benzene emissions reductions 
from PFC regulations at $0/ton, once fuel savings are considered, compared to vehicle emissions 
regulations imposed in the same rulemaking at $14/ton for hydrocarbons and $270/ton for benzene). See 
also CARB, Regulations for Portable Fuel Containers (PFC) and Spouts, supra note 18 (noting that the 
1999 California regulations were estimated to impose costs of about $2/ton of reduced ROG emissions, 
compared to $5/ton for contemporaneous alternative regulations). 
 31. See CARB, Regulations for Portable Fuel Containers (PFC) and Spouts, supra note 18. 
 32. See, e.g.,. Acme Tools, No Spill Gas Can, YOUTUBE (Oct. 8, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KneiOE7pqj4 (video showing proper use of one model of CARB-
compliant gas can, requiring one hand to hold the can while another operates the spout). But see, Scepter 
Products, How to use your ECO Can – English, YOUTUBE (Jul. 10, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nytxlA-G1Sk (video showing operation of another CARB-
compliant design that relies on plastic protrusions from the spout that allow stable receptacles like 
vehicles or lawnmowers to stabilize the can, allowing one-handed operation).  
 33. See Greg DiBernardo, Gas Cans that Actually Work, TOOLS OF THE TRADE (Oct. 10, 2013), 
http://www.toolsofthetrade.net/trucks-equipment/gas-cans-that-actually-work_o (testing pour rates of 
gas cans, and finding that CARB-compliant cans take 2:23-2:37 to pour 5 gallons of fuel, while an 
unregulated “utility jug” similar in design to pre-regulation cans takes 1:50 to pour the same amount). 
10
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been a disaster. These new cans have caused more gas to spill and 
more fumes to escape than any gas can in history. At least in my 
history; I don’t have any statistics to report about spills outside of 
my own garage. Suffice to say that everyone I’ve talked to about 
these new cans hates them, and reports similarly alarming spill 
statistics from their own experiences in their own garages.34 
 
This one doesn’t have a vent. Who would make a can without a 
vent unless it was done under duress? After all, everyone knows to 
vent anything that pours. Otherwise, it doesn’t pour right and is 
likely to spill.35 
 
The only gas cans they sell nowadays is [sic] a plastic one with a 
complicated thin plastic twisty spring loaded mechanism on the 
spout. The directions suck and so does the spout. One little twist 
and the thin plastic breaks, causing the seal to break. Tip the spout 
towards the lawn mower and half of it spills on the ground and 
over your hands.36 
 
In short, many gas can users do not like the new gas cans. Can 
manufacturers claim that more recent post-regulation designs have 
mitigated problems,37 but difficulty of use and consumer dissatisfaction 
appears persistent.38 
The gas can regulations may be justified based on their public 
benefits (i.e. reduction in the emissions externality), but consumer 
dissatisfaction suggests the regulation is a net negative considering only 
its private costs and benefits (i.e. to consumers). More expensive cans 
that do not work as well as those they replace are unlikely to be a 
popular option. Put differently, had they not been required by regulation 
it seems unlikely that new-style cans would have been successful in the 
 
 34. GAD’s Ramblings, One Man’s Quest for Gas Cans that Don’t Suck (Nov. 22, 2012), 
http://www.gad.net/Blog/2012/11/22/one-mans-quest-for-gas-cans-that-dont-suck/.  
 35. Jeffrey Tucker, LAISSEZ FAIRE, How Government Wrecked the Gas Can (May 7, 2012), 
https://lfb.org/how-government-wrecked-the-gas-can.  
 36. Intheknow, DAILY KOS, Has anyone purchases a new gas can lately? (Nov. 6, 2014), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/11/6/1342736/-Has-anyone-purchased-a-new-gas-can-lately.  
 37. See, e.g.,. No-Spill Inc., Features…Functions…& Benefits…, (2017) 
http://www.nospill.com/Why-NO-SPILL-.html (citing ease-of-use advantages of one particular CARB-
compliant model along with testimonials from customers and dealers). 
 38. See GAD’s Ramblings, supra note 34 (describing the No-Spill can as the best of the CARB-
compliant cans tested, but nevertheless concluding it has “many of the drawbacks that all of the new 
cans share, like hard to open, locking tops (especially in the cold), obnoxious caps that prevent the 
nozzle from fitting in gas tanks, what seem to be a terribly confusing spout assemblies, and finally, a 
ridiculously high price tag for all that pain”). See also DiBernardo, supra  note 33 (finding that a No-
spill can had the slowest pour rate among cans tested). 
11
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market. Some of this resistance, of course, could be due to a learning 
curve associated with the new cans or simple resistance to change, but 
that does not make it any less real.  
Regulators are aware of consumer resistance to post-regulation gas 
can designs—the 2005 revised California regulations “changed some 
existing requirements for flow-rate and spout design to make them more 
consumer friendly” in hopes that they would “result in containers that 
are easier and better accepted by the public.”39 California also revised its 
regulations so as to no longer require spouts with automatic shut-off 
features in response to consumer dissatisfaction.40 
It is even possible that the PFC regulations are counterproductive. If 
anecdotal evidence that the new cans lead to more spillage rather than 
less is correct, then it is possible that the regulations are not even 
justified based on their public environmental benefits. Spilled gasoline 
will inevitably evaporate, leading to VOC emissions. Good data on 
gasoline spill rates from pre- and post-regulation cans does not appear to 
be available, however. But even assuming that spills are not more likely 
in the long run, it is enough to consider the implications of customer 
dissatisfaction with post-regulation cans. 
This dissatisfaction should come as no surprise. It is probably 
unreasonable to expect that consumers would be happy with the tradeoff 
between the difficulty of use of the new cans and their relatively small 
private benefits (less fuel loss through evaporation).41 More generally, 
anyone subject to a regulation that imposes private costs in favor of 
public benefits is unlikely to be pleased with it. Certainly industry 
opposition to environmental and other regulation is de rigueur. At least 
among environmental regulations, however, the CARB/EPA gas can 
rules are unusual in that they directly affect consumers. More precisely, 
they affect consumer choice and specific features of consumer products, 
rather than simply imposing higher costs as an indirect effect of 
regulation on industry. Direct regulation of consumer products is 
common in other regulatory spheres (most notably product and 
food/drug safety), but it is not usually the locus of environmental 
regulation. Vehicles (discussed below) are perhaps the largest exception. 
 
 39. California Environmental Protection Agency, News Release, ARB Upgrades Clean Gas 
Rules (Sep. 15, 2005), https://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/nr091505.htm.  
 40. See EPA PFC Rule, supra note 2 at 8500. 
 41. See id. at 8521 (stating that “gasoline fuel savings are not included in the market analysis for 
this economic impact analysis because these savings are not expected to affect consumer decisions with 
respect to the purchase of new containers”). 
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C. Consumer Evasion 
Those subject to a regulation may oppose it in administrative, legal, 
or legislative venues, and even seek to skirt or evade it. Typically, 
regulated industries play this role, but the direct effects of gas can 
regulations on consumer choice give consumers an incentive to oppose 
or evade them as well. Consumers have strongly and creatively 
responded to this incentive, adopting a variety of tactics to evade gas 
can regulations—in the process reducing or negating any environmental 
benefits. 
First, the gas can regulations apply only to the manufacture or sale of 
new cans.42 Old-style vented cans are still legal to own and use.43 But 
their supply is now limited, with the predictable result that their price 
has increased.44 Therefore, users may hoard old cans, keep them in 
service longer (perhaps even if they leak), and, as noted, pay higher 
prices in the second-hand market for them. These behaviors may lead 
old cans to be retained in use at a greater rate than predicted by 
regulators, reducing expected benefits of the regulation (not to mention 
reducing revenues for manufacturers of new cans).45 In principle, a 
black-market for old-style cans could develop. I know of no evidence 
for this, though there is anecdotal evidence of vented cans being 
purchased in Canada for use in the US, circumventing EPA’s national 
regulation.46 
A second option is for consumers to modify new cans, defeating the 
 
 42. See id. at 8432 (stating that EPA national PFC regulations apply only to containers 
manufactured on or after January 1, 2009). 
 43. Id. (cans manufactured before January 1, 2009 not regulated). 
 44. Used old-style (vented) 5 gallon cans were available at time of writing for around $35-50 
shipped, compared to as little as $20 for a new condition compliant can. Compare eBay listings of 5-
gallon used pre-regulation cans (“5 gallon preban gas can”), http:// goo.gl/5KpVPh with those for new 
post-regulation cans (“5 gallon gas can CARB”), https://goo.gl/gUDgow. As noted above, the 
regulations also increased the price of new cans relative to pre-regulation cans, by an estimated $6-11. 
See CARB, Regulations for Portable Fuel Containers (PFC) and Spouts supra note 18. EPA predicted 
at 57% increase in gas can costs, and further predicted that 99% of these costs would be passed on to 
consumers. See EPA PFC Rule at 8521, 8523. 
 45. In 1999, California regulators estimated the average useful life of gas cans at 5 years. 
Although it is possible that the analysis producing this average contemplated a long tail of gas cans with 
much longer useful life, the widespread availability of pre-regulation cans 16 years after the initial 
CARB regulations and 7 years after the national EPA regulations suggests either that this estimate was 
too low or that the regulations encouraged consumers to keep pre-regulation cans longer than they 
would have otherwise. See California Air Resources Board, Hearing Notice and Staff Report: Initial 
Statement of Reasons for Proposed Rule Making, Public Hearing to Consider the Adoption of Portable 
Fuel Container Spillage Control Regulations (Aug. 6, 1999) at 23, 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/spillcon/isor.pdf. 
 46. See, e.g.,. Post on “The Hull Truth Boating Forum” (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://www.thehulltruth.com/dockside-chat/472908-where-get-real-5-gallon-gas-cans.html (describing 
successful purchase of unregulated cans in Canada and importation into the US). 
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emissions-control features. Instructions for how to do so are easily 
found; one simple fix is to drill a hole in a can and mount a tire valve 
(with the core removed) in the hole, creating a sealable vent, as shown 
in Figure 3.47 An even simpler modification, if it can be called that, is to 






















Figure 3: Gas can modified to allow venting 
D. Consumer-Producer Cooperation…or Collusion 
These methods for evading gas can regulations are purely consumer-
driven. Depending on one’s perspective, they could be viewed as either 
scofflaw mischief or homespun ingenuity (or perhaps some of both). 
Such reactions are not surprising, though they do illustrate—in dollar 
terms, in the case of higher prices for old cans—the level of consumer 
dissatisfaction with the regulatory mandate. More interesting from a 
regulatory design perspective, however, are another class of reactions 
that are neither purely consumer nor purely producer, instead requiring 
tacit cooperation or outright collusion between the two to evade 
regulation. 
 
 47. See, e.g., DoubleSurvivalists, How to Fix a New Gas Can, YOUTUBE (Oct. 8, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0lcnwdIYEfI (detailing process for modifying post-regulation cans 
to add a vent). 
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Perhaps the simplest way to evade the gas can regulations is to store 
gasoline in another container, one lacking the troublesome new spout 
and having a vent. Ready substitutes exist, most obviously cans intended 
for other fuels such as diesel and kerosene. One might expect such 
containers to be regulated at the same standards as gas cans, since all 
volatile petroleum fuels contribute to VOC emissions if they spill or 
evaporate; however, early versions of the gas can regulations excluded 
containers for other fuels.48 As a result, consumers, frustrated with new 
gas cans, had a ready substitute that was often sold on the same shelf.49 
In 2005, California closed this loophole by including kerosene cans in 
its revised standards, explicitly to prevent consumer evasion of the 
regulation.50 The rule does not address whether imposing restrictions on 
kerosene containers is justified on its own merits, i.e., considering 
emissions from kerosene containers used for kerosene only. The EPA 
followed suit in its 2007 national regulations by including diesel and 
kerosene containers.51 
Including containers labeled for other fuels within the regulations 
does not, of course, prevent consumers from using other containers not 
explicitly marketed for use with fuel. One example are so-called “utility 
jugs” not labeled as gas cans but often with auto racing-themed branding 
(see Figure 4). These are fairly clearly aimed at the gas can market; as 
EPA notes, they are “designed and marketed for use with gasoline.” 52 
Recognizing this loophole in the early California rules, EPA’s 2005 
regulations apply to utility jugs53 and California has clarified that its 
rules also apply.54 Nevertheless, manufacturers seem to evade these 
requirements—utility jugs with vents and without auto-closing spouts 





 48. See California Air Resources Board, Staff Report: Initial Statement of Reasons for Proposed 
Amendments to the Portable Fuel Container Regulations (July 29, 2005), 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/pfc/2005/isor.pdf (noting that “kerosene containers that were not included 
in the original regulations have become inexpensive PFC substitutes”). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See California Air Resources Board, New Requirements for Kerosene Containers (Oct 2005), 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/enf/advs/advs338.pdf (describing revisions to the 2005 California PFC 
regulations to include previously unregulated kerosene containers). 
 51. See EPA PFC Rule, supra note 2 at 8499. 
 52. Id. at 8500. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See California Air Resources Board, Clarified Requirements for Utility Jugs (Dec. 2005), 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/enf/advs/advs342.pdf. 
 55. See, e.g., .VP Racing Fuel 3012 Red Fuel Jug, Amazon.com, https://smile.amazon.com/VP-
Racing-Fuel-3012-Red/dp/B003TTPHLQ. 
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Figure 4: "Utility jug"; 
note vent, lack of self-closing 






Another option is to use containers not designed for petroleum fuels 
at all. In principle, it is of course possible to store gasoline in any large 
container, but a container has to be a superior substitute to post-
regulation gas cans to be an attractive alternative. Containers that leak, 
react with gasoline, or are unwieldy to pour will not tempt consumers. 
But at least one product will: military-style potable water containers. 
Such containers are made by the same manufacturers as military-style 
gasoline cans, and are designed to the same size specifications 
(presumably initially for military standardization and storage 















Figure 5: Potable water can (note old-style spout and presence of vent) and 
similar regulation-compliant gas can from the same manufacturer 
 
 56. Compare Scepter ECO Jerry Can, Amazon.com, available at 
https://smile.amazon.com/Scepter-Resistant-Closures-5-Gallon-Military/dp/B000MT94TC (CARB/EPA 
compliant gas can) with Scepter Water Can, Amazon.com, available at 
https://smile.amazon.com/Scepter-04933-Water-Can-5-Gallon/dp/B000MTI0GA (Water can from the 
same manufacturer, in a nearly identical design, with pre-regulation spout and vent).  
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 Although not marketed for use with fuel (and in fact clearly labeled 
for water use), consumers are buying these cans for use with gasoline. 
As Amazon reviewers have said about these cans:  
 
Just like the good old days. It makes a great fuel can because it's 
got a vent and it pours without any CARB drama.57 
 
Are you sick of gas cans with locks/valves on them? Do you want 
a gas can just like the old-school ones, with a bleeder and simple, 
unobstructed pour spout? This is the gas can for you, then, even 
though it's sold as a water can and even has markings on the can 
stating "Potable Water". As far as I can tell, the only difference is 
the color (blue instead of red) and writing on the side. Otherwise, 
it's near perfect. It pours very quickly.58 
Great gas can! Screw CARB.59 
 
Using cans not labeled for gasoline use may be a violation of other 
safety-driven regulations. But these are effectively unenforceable for 
small-scale home use. Simply painting non-gasoline cans red and 
marking them “Gasoline” may be sufficient to comply.60 
Using a new container not labeled for gasoline to evade CARB/EPA 
emissions regulations requires some level of cooperation between 
consumers and manufacturers. The degree of such cooperation varies—
utility jugs are clearly marketed for use with gasoline, but there is little 
evidence that water jugs are. Manufacturers would likely insist that 
water containers should not be used for gasoline. One manufacturer lists 
its water container only among “Canada/International” fuel containers 
and indicates it is “not available in the U.S.,” presumably to avoid the 
implication that it could or should be used for gasoline.61 Despite the 
claim, however, the container is in fact available in the U.S.62 
Manufacturers do of course profit from cans not marked for gasoline 
 
 57. Ron Strand, Customer Review, Amazon.com (May 23, 2012), available at  
https://smile.amazon.com/review/R28CTMWIA2B76U.  
 58. Culturejamming, Customer Review, Amazon.com (September 6, 2016), available at 
https://smile.amazon.com/gp/customer-reviews/ROUS9S4S6HNQN.  
 59. Corey Reynolds, Customer Review, Amazon.com (July 20, 2015), available at 
https://smile.amazon.com/gp/customer-reviews/R1HFK2Y4RUD90Q.  
 60. See, e.g., Wis.. WI Stat. § 168.11 (2015) (containers used to store gasoline must be “a bright 
red color” and be marked with their contents, but the statute does not specify whether this color and 
marking must be applied by the manufacturer, or whether the container must be designed and marketed 
for gasoline use). 
 61. See Scepter, Inc., CDN/INT’L Fuel Containers, available at 
http://www.scepterconsumer.com/fuel_containers/regular_fuel_containers/. 
 62. Scepter Water Can, Amazon.com, available at https://smile.amazon.com/Scepter-04933-
Water-Can-5-Gallon/dp/B000MTI0GA. 
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sold to consumers seeking to evade regulations. Some of these sales may 
cannibalize sales of compliant cans (possibly reducing profits given the 
higher cost of compliant cans). But the availability of unregulated retail 
options may also attract customers away from the secondary market for 
pre-regulation cans, increasing overall retail sales and manufacturer 
profits. 
A final option for evading gas can emissions regulations is the 
clearest example of consumer-manufacturer collusion: some firms 
provide aftermarket kits for modifying cans so as to circumvent the 
emissions-reduction features. For example, the “EZ-Pour Universal 
Replacement Spout and Vent Kit” allows you to “make your gas can 
great again.”63 The manufacturer’s website states that the kit “is 
designed and sold as replacement parts specifically for portable fuel 
containers manufactured before January 2009,”64 and the product is 
marketed as a “water jug spout” in some states.65 Presumably these 
statements and labeling are intended to escape regulatory scrutiny. 
However, a photo on the product’s web page touts the kit’s 
compatibility with a wide range of post-regulation cans,66 and the 
product’s instructions describe how to drill a hole in an unvented can, an 
unnecessary step if the kit were used only to repair a pre-regulation 
vented can.67  
A similar product, the “No-Bama Replacement Spout & Vent Kit” 
more openly targets consumers seeking to avoid regulation.68 This 
product also claims to be aimed at repair of old cans, but the seller’s 
video installation instructions show modification of a post-regulation 
can and describe the advantages of the product’s non-compliant 
traditional spout over self-closing spouts.69 The product’s name is a 
(perhaps knowing) misnomer: the 2005 EPA regulations were finalized 




 63. EZ-POUR Universal Fuel and Water Jug Spout, available at http://ezpourspout.com/. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See EZ-POUR, Order Water Spouts, http://ezpourspout.com/order/order-water-can-2/ (note 
alternative labeling of same product as “water jug spout”; website users are directed to this page after 
indicating they are residents of one of 9 states, including California and New York, or the District of 
Columbia, which have state-level gas can regulations). 
 66. EZ-POUR, Compatible Fuel Cans, http://ezpourspout.com/compatible-cans/compatible-
cans/.  
 67. EZ-POUR, Installation Instructions, http://ezpourspout.com/INSTRUCTIONS-
ENGLISH.pdf. 
 68. No-Bama Replacement Spout & Vent Kit, alaskansongs.com, 
http://alaskansongs.com/product/no-bama-replacement-spout-vent-kit/. 
 69. 360 Productions, No-Bama Replacement Spout and Vent Kit, YOUTUBE (Aug. 13, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hh9RlMC3G-E. 
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Figure 6: The “No-Bama Replacement Spout and Vent Kit” 
 
To be clear, neither of these products appear to be made by firms that 
manufacture regulated cans. At least one can manufacturer does, 
however, supply “replacement spouts” that can be used to circumvent 
the regulatory requirement for self-closing spouts, but unlike the kits 
described above, this product does not include a vent.70 
In short, consumers have multiple, relatively easy ways to purchase 
products from gas can manufacturers or third parties to effectively evade 
the EPA’s and CARB’s gas can regulations. The degree of such 
consumer-producer cooperation varies: major gas can manufacturers 
produce only compliant cans for the US market, and do not openly 
market substitutes (such as water cans) for gasoline use. But they do sell 
and profit from these products, and some offer replacement parts that 
can be used to circumvent the regulations. Smaller firms produce 
products that are more openly marketed toward regulatory evasion, from 
“utility cans” with racing-themed branding to the “No-Bama” retrofit 
spout and vent. 
 
 70. Moeller Scepter Gas/Diesel/Water Can Replacement Parts, Amazon.com, available at 
https://www.amazon.com/Moeller-Scepter-Diesel-Water-Replacement/dp/B000MTCQO2. 
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E. Environmental and Political Effects 
It is difficult and likely impossible to determine the degree to which 
consumers have been able to evade the EPA/CARB gas can regulations. 
Home modifications are impossible to track, and though it may be 
possible to obtain sales data for water cans and modification kits, it 
would remain unclear to what extent these were used for their ostensibly 
intended uses or for regulatory evasion. It is at least clear, however, that 
sufficient evasion occurs to support a market in products implicitly or 
explicitly aimed at enabling evasion. 
If evasion is significant, it erodes the environmental benefits of the 
regulation. Some forms of evasion also increase private costs: some 
consumers may buy compliant cans, install aftermarket replacements or 
home modifications, and discard the complex spouts that drive up prices 
of the new cans. Such customers must pay twice—first for the post-
regulation can, then again for aftermarket kits or parts for homebrew 
modification. They then discard the new spout, likely the most 
expensive part of the can, and must spend time making the 
modifications. Administrative costs for regulators also increase, as 
evidenced by California’s revisions in 2005, including utility jugs and 
kerosene cans so as to shut off the most obvious evasion opportunities.71  
But perhaps less obvious are the political costs of the gas can 
regulations. As the consumer complaints about compliant cans and 
comments regarding products for evading the regulations indicate, 
consumer dissatisfaction is significant. Moreover, dissatisfaction is not 
limited to consumers whose politics might attract them to products like 
the “No-Bama” replacement spout. As a user of left-leaning website 
Daily Kos puts it: 
 
I love President Obama and what he has done for this country. 
However the gas can regulations translate to everyday people who 
mow yards and snow blow driveways as pure stupidity.  The gas 
cans can be what people think about when they hear these doom 
and gloom Obamacare stories coming from Republicans. They see 
the new gas cans and believe the GOP when they charge 
incompetence.72 
 
I suspect most readers were unfamiliar with gas can regulations, and 
certainly with consumer dissatisfaction and attempts at evasion. These 
are relatively minor environmental regulations in terms of both cost and 
 
 71. See California Air Resources Board, New Requirements for Kerosene Containers, supra note 
50. 
 72. Intheknow, Daily Kos, Has anyone purchases a new gas can lately?, supra note 36. 
20
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss1/5
2018] SOCIAL LICENSE TO REGULATE 173 
environmental benefit.; Their visibility to and impact on frequent gas 
can users is non-trivial, however, or at least appears to play into 
preexisting anti-regulatory sentiment to a greater degree than other 
environmental regulations with less direct effect on consumers. The 
failures of new-style cans are not only a source of frustration but, for 
some, a vivid example of what they perceive as general regulatory 
overreach. 
III. REGULATING LIGHT BULB EFFICIENCY 
Some readers may be reminded of a similar regulatory story that 
received much greater public attention—the federal government’s 
alleged ban on incandescent light bulbs. This experience shares many 
characteristics with that of the gas can regulation, although there are 
important differences. Environmental regulation directly affecting 
consumers is imposed (though by Congress, not regulators). It is well 
intentioned, appearing to generate both public and private net benefits. 
But many consumers are unhappy with the resulting reduction in 
choices, either because they find the new options to be poor substitutes 
or because of principled objections to regulatory interference (or 
both)—though there is never a complete ban on the old bulbs. Some 
consumers react by finding ways to evade the regulation, assisted in 
these efforts by industry but not by the largest firms. 
Incandescent light bulbs produce light by running electric current 
through a metal (usually tungsten) filament, producing light as well as 
heat.73 They have long been the most prevalent electric lighting 
technology, but are relatively inefficient (in terms of light output per 
unit of energy input) relative to alternatives. Less than 10% of energy 
input to an incandescent bulb is converted into visible light.74 Both 
fluorescent lighting and electronic LED (light emitting diode) bulbs are 
substantially more efficient.75 LED and compact fluorescent (CFL) 
bulbs only became commercially available relatively recently, however. 
Of the two new technologies, CFLs became available first, in the 1990s, 
and more widely in the early 2000s.76 LED availability has substantially 
increased and prices have substantially dropped since 2008.77 Despite 
 
 73. See Incandescent Light Bulb, Wikipedia available at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incandescent_light_bulb. 
 74. See Department of Energy, Lighting Choices to Save You Money, Energy.gov, available at 
https://energy.gov/energysaver/lighting-choices-save-you-money (indicating that 90% of energy input 
for incandescent bulbs is given off as heat). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Department of Energy, The History of the Light Bulb, Energy.gov, available at 
https://www.energy.gov/articles/history-light-bulb 
 77. Id. 
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their superior efficiency, however, consumers were slow to adopt the 
new CFLs.78 This is a specific illustration of the wider “energy 
efficiency paradox” or “gap,” an expression of academic puzzlement at 
consumers’ reluctance or inability to take advantage of energy 
efficiency opportunities that at least appear to be beneficial even 

























Figure 7: Light bulb technologies; from left to right, an LED, incandescent, and 
CFL bulb. All three produce roughly the same amount of light, but the 
incandescent bulb uses 60 watts of electricity to do so, while the CFL uses 13 watts 
and the LED only 7.5 watts.80 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. See, e.g. Kenneth Gillingham and Karen Palmer, Bridging the Energy Efficiency Gap: Policy 
Insights from Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence, 8 REV. ENVIRON. ECON. POLICY 18 (2014) 
(analyzing empirical evidence for various explanations of an energy efficiency gap). 
 80. Image source: Flickr user trenttsd, CC BY 2.0 license, available at 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/84335369@N00/3258261439. 
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A. The Light Bulb “Ban” 
Of course, energy efficiency improvements also have public benefits. 
Lower energy use means less air pollution from fossil fuel power plants, 
and less need for investment in new generation paid for by all 
ratepayers. The government, therefore, promotes energy efficiency 
through regulatory tools, from building codes to tax deductions. The 
most frequently used tool is probably product efficiency standards, 
applied to consumer products that range from vehicles to appliances.81 
In 2007, Congress passed legislation—the Energy Independence and 
Security Act (EISA)—that imposed efficiency standards on most light 
bulbs.82 These standards would effectively ban the manufacture of most 
incandescent light bulbs, at least without large efficiency improvements. 
The statute also directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to 
promulgate more stringent standards after 2014.83 Bulbs also must 
continue to improve, achieving a 60-70% efficiency improvement over 
2008 levels (45 lumens per watt) by 2020.84 
The 2007 efficiency standards inspired political and consumer 
pushback even before entering into effect. Conservative groups attacked 
the regulation as “governmental interference in our lives” or 
“interfer[ence] with free enterprise.”85 In 2011, then-Secretary of Energy 
Steven Chu responded with the assertion that “We are taking away a 
choice that continues to let people waste their own money.”86 
Republican legislators, some of whom voted for the 2007 bill,87 passed 
legislation defunding enforcement of the regulation.88 Lighting industry 
 
 81. See, e.g., Department of Energy, Appliance and Equipment Standards Program, 
ENERGY.GOV, https://energy.gov/eere/buildings/appliance-and-equipment-standards-program (detailing 
federal efficiency standards for “more than 60 categories of appliances and equipment”). 
 82. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140 § 321, 121 Stat. 1492, 
1573-87 (2007). 
 83. Energy Independence and Security Act § 321(a)(6)(A)(i). 
 84. Id. at § 321(a)(6)(A)(v). 
 85. See Robert Farley, Banned light bulbs? Is the government saying no to incandescents? 
POLITIFACT (May 24, 2011), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2011/may/24/government-
banning-incandescent-light-bulbs/ (quoting from a fundraising letter sent by AmeriPAC, “a political 
action committee that largely supports conservative Republican candidates” and the Center for the 
Defense of Free Enterprise Action Fund). 
 86. See Ryan Tracy and Stephanie Gleason, New Flare-Up in Light-Bulb Wars, WALL ST. J. 
(July 9, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304793504576434122693094168 
(quoting Secretary Chu in a conference call with reporters). 
 87. See Sean Collins Walsh, G.O.P. Bid to Void Light Bulb Fails, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/business/energy-environment/republicans-fail-to-annul-new-light-
bulb-law.html (quoting Fred Upton [R-MI] in 2007 characterizing the EISA as a “common-sense, 
bipartisan approach”, only later to remove the statement from his website and replace it with a claim that 
“[t]he public response on this issue is a clear signal that markets—not governments—should be driving 
technological advancements”). 
 88. See Stephen Dinan, Congress overturns incandescent light bulb ban, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 16, 
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firms spoke in favor of the impending regulation, however, claiming 
they had already made anticipatory investments; it is also possible they 
expected greater revenues and profits from the new, more expensive 
bulbs relative to commodity-priced incandescent bulbs.89 Despite this 
period of public controversy and political retrenchment, the EISA 
remains in effect, along with its efficiency standards for incandescent 
bulbs.90 
B. Consumer Reactions 
Initially, many consumers felt that new bulbs were inferior. CFLs 
were moderately more expensive up front, often did not work with 
dimmer switches, produced a flicker that some found annoying, and 
released mercury vapor if broken, among other complaints.91 LEDs were 
even more expensive up front, though their long life and low energy use 
made them cheaper over the long run.92 Many consumers simply 
preferred incandescent bulbs, even once they became aware of 
alternatives and their energy-saving advantages.93 The “light bulb ban” 
remains an oft-cited symbol of alleged over-regulation and government 
intrusion into consumer decision making.94 
Despite this controversy, the EISA bulb regulations entered into 
effect more or less as planned during the 2012-2014 period.95 Today, 
few if any traditional general service, non-halogen incandescent bulbs 




 89. See Tracy and Gleason, supra  note 86. 
 90. See 42 U.S.C. § 6295(i)(2018) (codifying the 2007 EISA). 
 91. See, e.g.,. Nick Davis, Disadvantages of CFL Light Bulbs, EHOW, 
http://www.ehow.com/list_6508643_disadvantages-cfl-light-bulbs.html. 
 92. See Department of Energy, How Energy-Efficiency Light Bulbs Compare with Traditional 
Incandescents, ENERGY.GOV, https://energy.gov/energysaver/how-energy-efficient-light-bulbs-compare-
traditional-incandescents. 
 93. See, e.g.,. Jolie Dee, Why people still use inefficient incandescent light bulbs, USA TODAY 
(Dec. 27, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2013/12/27/incandescent-light-bulbs-
phaseout-leds/4217009/; Penelope Green, Light Bulb Saving Time, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/garden/fearing-the-phase-out-of-incandescent-bulbs.html 
(describing preference of some interior designers and restauranteurs for incandescent light). 
 94. See, e.g. The Colbert Report, Light Bulb Ban, COMEDY CENTRAL (Mar. 8, 2011), 
http://www.cc.com/video-clips/29cv4a/the-colbert-report-light-bulb-ban (satirizing the 2007 EISA); See 
also Tim Worstall, Brexit Will Free The Bendy Banana, Incandescent Light Bulbs And Tomato 
Marmalade, FORBES (June 26, 2016) (claiming that the UK’s vote to leave the European Union will free 
it from burdensome EU regulations, including an incandescent phase-out). 
 95. See 42 U.S.C. § 6295(i)(2018) (codifying the 2007 EISA); see also Department of Energy, 
New Lighting Standards Began in 2012, ENERGY.GOV, https://energy.gov/energysaver/new-lighting-
standards-began-2012. 
 96. See, e.g., Peter Whoriskey, Light bulb factory closes; End of era for U.S. means more jobs 
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some consumers reacted by attempting to evade the ban. “Evade” is 
perhaps not the right term—few of the strategies for continuing to use 
incandescent bulbs described below violate the law. All do, however, 
circumvent its goal of pushing consumers toward alternatives. 
Consumers’ first and best option was to buy traditional incandescent 
bulbs while they remained available. The EISA did not ban sale of 
incandescent bulbs, only their manufacture.98 Retailer stock persisted for 
some time,99 and some consumers hoarded incandescent bulbs in 
advance of the ban on manufacture.100 Industry provided a second 
option—manufacturers were able to produce improved halogen 
incandescent bulbs that could meet the 2012-2014 standards.101 These 
halogen bulbs have characteristics similar to traditional incandescent 
bulbs, but they are more expensive.102 This is only a temporary option, 
however, because halogen bulbs will not meet the stricter 2020 
efficiency standards.103 Another option is to import bulbs from countries 
outside the U.S. without equivalent bans. The EISA does forbid 
importation of bulbs that violate its efficiency standards,104 but imported 
 
overseas, WASH. POST (Sep. 8, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/09/07/AR2010090706933.html.  
 97. For example, as of this writing major retailers like Home Depot no longer offer general 
service incandescent bulbs for sale, offering only halogen “eco-incandescent” bulbs and specialized 
types like flood or globe lights excluded from the EISA regulations. See Home Depot, Incandescent 
Light Bulbs, available at http://www.homedepot.com/b/Lighting-Ceiling-Fans-Light-Bulbs-
Incandescent-Light-Bulbs/N-5yc1vZbmgl.  
 98. 42 U.S.C. § 6295(i)(2) (“it shall not be unlawful for a manufacturer to sell a lamp which is in 
compliance with the law at the time such lamp was manufactured”). 
 99. See Patrick K. Kiger, U.S. Phase-Out of Incandescent Light Bulbs Continues in 2014 with 
40-, 60-Watt Varieties, NAT. GEO. (Dec. 31, 2013), 
http://energyblog.nationalgeographic.com/2013/12/31/u-s-phase-out-of-incandescent-light-bulbs-
continues-in-2014-with-40-60-watt-varieties/ (“[u]ntil the supplies run out, the old bulbs still will be 
available on store shelves, alongside the electricity-saving alternatives that gradually will replace 
them”). 
 100. See, e.g.,. Nancy Smith, How to Have Incandescent Light Bulbs for the Rest of Your Life, 
PREP HAPPY (Jan. 10, 2014), http://prephappy.com/light/how-to-have-incandescent-light-bulbs-for-the-
rest-of-your-life/ (detailed instructions on how to hoard pre-regulation incandescent bulbs, including 
instructions on long-term storage and a calculator for determining how many bulbs to buy for long-term 
needs); see also Cord Jefferson, The American Outlaws Hoarding Lightbulbs in the Name of Liberty, 
GIZMODO (Sep. 20, 2012), http://gizmodo.com/5943048/the-american-outlaws-hoarding-lightbulbs-in-
the-name-of-liberty. 
 101. See Department of Energy, Incandescent Lighting, ENERGY.GOV, 
https://energy.gov/energysaver/incandescent-lighting (describing halogen bulb technology as a 
replacement for traditional incandescent bulbs that will be phased out due to regulation).  
 102. Id. 
 103. See Owen Comstock and Kevin Jarzomski, LED bulb efficiency expected to continue 
improving as cost declines, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION: TODAY IN ENERGY (Mar. 
19, 2014), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=15471 (“[a]n additional round of standards 
taking effect in 2020 will likely be too stringent for halogen incandescent lamps to meet, and major 
manufacturers have already focused development on more-efficient technologies”). 
 104. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140 § 321(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV), 
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bulbs nevertheless appear to be available.105 Sellers of imported bulbs 
may be evading detection by regulators, or regulators may be unable to 
enforce the standards against smugglers due to lack of congressional 
appropriations to do so.106 
C. Consumer-Producer Cooperation 
No such bulb-smuggling is necessary, however, to buy as many 
relatively inefficient incandescent bulbs as a consumer wants. This is 
due to the wide range of bulb types excluded from the EISA efficiency 
rules. Many categories of “specialty” bulbs are excluded, including 
candelabra and globe style bulbs, 3-way bulbs, outdoor “bug lights,” 
reflector/flood lights, plant grow lights, and “rough-service” bulbs.107 In 
other words, only standard lamp bulbs are affected by the standards, at 
least initially.108 Since many of the excluded categories can be easily 
substituted for lamp bulbs, circumventing the regulation is easy.109 This 
is most true of “rough service” bulbs, defined in the EISA as those with 
extra support for filaments and “designated and marketed specifically 
for ‘rough service’ applications.”110 In short, manufacturers only need to 
make minor changes to bulb designs and change their labeling or 
marketing materials in order to continue to sell very similar 
incandescent bulbs. 
Manufacturers have responded by making rough service bulbs, 
previously a niche product, widely available—in fact, they and other 
exempted bulbs are the only incandescent bulbs available from most 
major retailers.111 Nevertheless, major lighting manufacturers have 
increasingly moved production to halogen, CFL and, increasingly, LED 
 
121 Stat. 1492, 1578 (2007) (standards apply to lamps [bulbs] “manufactured or imported after  
December 31, 2011”). 
 105. See, e.g.,. Glen Horn, Customer Review, Amazon.com (Jan. 10, 2017), available at 
https://smile.amazon.com/gp/customer-reviews/RMXAUN6FKE7YY (reporting receipt of 100-watt 
incandescent bulbs made in Hungary and marked “Not for Sale in the USA” after online purchase). 
 106. Large manufacturers, in contrast, are unlikely to restart production of incandescent bulbs 
even if DOE lacks funding to pursue legal action. 
 107. Energy Independence and Security Act § 321(a)(1)(D)(ii). 
 108. In early 2017, DOE finalized regulation terminating some of the EISA exemptions effective 
in 2020, discussed below. See Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for 
General Service Lamps, 82 Fed. Reg. 7276 (Jan. 19, 2017) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430). 
 109. See id. at 7288 (noting ease of substitution between general service incandescents and some 
430).types of specialty bulbs). 
 110. See Energy Independence and Security Act § 321(a)(1)(X). 
 111. At the time of writing, the only A-series (traditional shape) 100-watt incandescent bulbs sold 
by retailer Home Depot are 3-way, rough service, and other specialty bulbs, all of which are currently 
exempt from the efficiency standards. See Homedepot.com, Incandescent Light Bulbs (last visited 
March 16, 2017), available at http://www.homedepot.com/b/Electrical-Light-Bulbs-Incandescent-Light-
Bulbs/A-Line/N-5yc1vZbmglZ2bcoqwZ1z132pi?NCNI-5.  
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Figure 8: Market Penetration by Light Bulb Technology by Quarter113 
 
Despite declining production from major firms, independent 
manufacturers have entered the market in an effort to meet persistent 
demand for incandescent bulbs. New Jersey-based “Newcandescent” 
produces (or perhaps just markets) a wide range of bulbs 
indistinguishable from traditional incandescent bulbs, most of which are 
marketed as rough service bulbs.114  
There is one drawback, however: like halogens, rough service and 
other specialty bulbs are more expensive (at least up front) than pre-
regulation incandescent bulbs, at around $2-4 per bulb, compared to the 
 
 112. See Tracy Cullen, LED A-Line Lamp Shipments Increase in Third Quarter of 2016, NEMA 
(Jan. 23, 2017),  https://www.nema.org/news/Pages/LED-A-Line-Lamp-Shipments-Increase-in-Third-
Quarter-of-2016.aspx (detailing substantial increase in market share of halogen, CFL, and LED bulbs 
since 2011). See also See LAURA JAMES ET AL.., COLORADO LIGHTING MARKET STUDY 3 (2016), 
https://www.xcelenergy.com/staticfiles/xe/PDF/Regulatory/CO-DSM/CO-Regulatory-DSM-Lighting-
Market-Study.pdf (2016 survey of Colorado bulb availability, finding little or no pre-regulation bulbs on 
store shelves). See also Michael Nunez, GE Will Stop Making CFL Lightbulbs Because LEDs Are 
Better, GIZMODO (Feb. 1, 2016), http://gizmodo.com/ge-will-no-longer-make-cfl-lighbulbs-
1756344245. 
 113. Cullen, supra note 114. 
 114. See Incandescent Light Bulbs, NEWCANDESCENT, http://www.newcandescent.com/ (“In 
order to address the demand by the public for the quality of light that an incandescent light bulb 
produces, the Newcandescent light bulb was created. This modified version of the incandescent light 
bulb provides the same quality of light most have come to expect…This longer lasting light bulb can 
also be used for “rough use” and is exempt from this recent legislation”). 
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under a $1 prices once charged for incandescent bulbs.115 It is unclear 
whether these higher prices are due to the slight modifications necessary 
to qualify bulbs as rough service or to reductions in economies of scale 
due to lower demand. At these prices for exempted bulbs, incandescent 
bulbs become much less attractive when compared with declining prices 
for more efficient bulbs, especially LEDs. For similar light output and at 
2016-2017 prices, LEDs are around the same price as rough service 
incandescent bulbs, but have a much longer life and reduced energy 
requirements; therefore, these LEDs have a far smaller total cost of 
ownership.116 Whatever economic arguments in favor of incandescent 
bulbs that may have existed in early days of the EISA regulations when 
LEDs were expensive and CFLs unappealing, they have now 
disappeared. Nevertheless, for those who prefer their light or who 
simply hate change, incandescent bulbs remain available.  
Congress did anticipate the possibility of bulb types excluded from 
the EISA efficiency requirements being used to evade the regulations. 
The EISA contains a provision directing the Secretary of Energy to 
monitor sales of excluded bulb types and, if they double in sales relative 
to projections, issue a rulemaking setting more stringent efficiency 
standards for them.117 Through 2016, the DOE monitored sales of 
excluded types and did not observe sufficient sales growth to issue 
regulations.118 For example, 2015 sales of rough service bulbs exceeded 
projections, but only by 35.5%, not enough to trigger a rulemaking.119  
In early 2017, however, the DOE issued a final rulemaking setting 
new, more stringent incandescent bulb standards and narrowing the 
categories of exempted bulbs.120 Though critics called the regulatory 
 
 115. Compare Patrick J. Kiger, Separating Myth From Fact on CFL and LED Light Bulbs: Five 
Concerns Addressed, NAT. GEO. (Jan. 8, 2014), 
http://energyblog.nationalgeographic.com/2014/01/08/separating-myth-from-fact-on-cfls-and-leds-five-
concerns-addressed/comment-page-18/ (estimating price of pre-regulation incandescent bulbs at 
$1/bulb); Incandescent Light Bulbs, HOMEDEPOT, http://www.homedepot.com/b/Electrical-Light-
Bulbs-Incandescent-Light-Bulbs/A-Line/N-5yc1vZbmglZ2bcoqwZ1z132pi?NCNI-5 (last visited Mar. 
16, 2017) (listing current prices of exempted bulbs; at the time of writing approximately $2-4 for 3-way 
bulbs and $2 for rough service bulbs, although clear “traffic light” bulbs remain available for less than 
$1/bulb). 
 116. See Severin Borenstein, Energy Institute at Haas Blog, Trash those incandescent bulbs 
today! (Oct. 3, 2016), available at https://energyathaas.wordpress.com/2016/10/03/trash-those-
incandescent-bulbs-today/ (estimating savings of $2.39, 80% of purchase cost, for LEDs over 
incandescents in the first year alone).  
 117. See, e.g.,. 42 U.S.C. §6295(i)(4)(D)(2018) (directing Secretary of Energy to monitor sales of 
rough service bulbs and regulate if sales increase). 
 118. See Energy Conservation Program: Data Collection and Comparison With Forecasted Unit 
Sales of Five Lamp Types; Notice of data availability, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,261 (Apr. 7, 2016). 
 119. Id. at § IV(A). 
 120. See Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for General Service 
Lamps, 82 Fed. Reg. 7276 (Jan. 19, 2017) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430). 
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action a “midnight rulemaking” made in anticipation of the change in 
administrations,121 the 2007 EISA does require the DOE to issue revised 
regulations by January 2017.122 Specifically, the rule discontinues the 
rough service bulb exemption, along with those for 3-way incandescent 
bulbs, vibration services lamps, and certain specialized lamp types under 
40 watts.123 These categories have the largest sales volume among the 
exempted categories,124 suggesting that they are being used as 
replacements for general service incandescent bulbs.125 
This rulemaking appears to close the rough service loophole, bringing 
the regulations initially implemented by the 2007 EISA somewhat closer 
to a true incandescent bulb ban, and it will when and if it enters into 
effect in 2020.126 Given the election of Donald Trump in 2016 and his 
administration’s anti-regulatory agenda, it seems unlikely that the 
rulemaking will ever enter into effect. Moreover, by 2020 LED bulbs 
are likely to have fallen further in price and consumer acceptance of 
them will likely have grown as well. The policy and political 
significance of the bulb efficiency standards, therefore, may decline 
substantially. 
In short, there never really was a “bulb ban,” or if there was, 
consumers and the industry were able to rapidly cooperate to evade it. 
As with the gas can regulations, the government was largely unwilling 
or unable to prevent such evasion, with the notable exception of the 
January 2017 revised standards, should they enter into effect.  
D. Environmental and Political Effects 
But this does not mean that evasion was widespread—it may have 
been limited to a small group of incandescent bulb loyalists. As with the 
gas can rules, assessing the extent to which consumer evasion of bulb 
efficiency standards undercut the goals of regulation is difficult. But 
there is some evidence, and it is mixed on the degree to which 
consumers substituted specialty bulbs exempt from the regulation for 
traditional incandescent bulbs. The data made public by the Energy 
 
 121. See Timothy P. Carney, With midnight regulation, Obama Energy Department just outlawed 
your three-way bulb, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/with-
midnight-regulation-obama-energy-department-just-outlawed-your-three-way-bulb/article/2612397. 
 122. 42 U.S.C. § 6295(i)(6)(A)(iii). 
 123. See Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for General Service 
Lamps, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7291. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 7288 (“DOE has based its decision on each exemption on an assessment of whether the 
exemption encompasses lamps that can provide general illumination and can functionally be a ready 
substitute for lamps already covered as [general service lamps]”).  
 126. Id. at 7276 (“[t]he effective date of this rule is January 1, 2020”). 
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Information Administration (EIA) in 2013, as the regulation was 
entering into effect, showed a drop in sales of specialty bulbs, rather 
than the increase one would expect if consumers were shifting toward 



















As the EIA said, “the reduced sales of these incandescent specialty 
bulbs could be attributable to market transformation to more efficient 
lighting”—in other words, at the same time as the regulation entered 
into effect, technological improvements made CFL and LED 
alternatives more attractive, reducing demand for specialty incandescent 
bulbs at a faster rate than consumer evasion of the efficiency standards 
increased it.129 Of course, if such technology-driven market trends 
dominate readily available opportunities for consumers to evade 
regulation, they draw into question how much of the efficiency 
improvement is driven by the bulb regulations at all. Perhaps, however, 
regulations were able to shift consumer behavior away from a 
suboptimal equilibrium into a mutually-beneficial LED-preferring 
equilibrium, or were able to give producers enough confidence in LED 
sales to ramp up production and take advantage of economies of scale. 
Post-2013 data presents a more mixed picture of exempted bulb sales. 
One study reported that incandescent bulbs made up 43% of retail bulb 
 
 127. See Sales of specialty incandescent bulbs decline despite exemption from efficiency 
standards, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION: TODAY IN ENERGY (Apr. 2, 2013), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=10631.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
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sales in Colorado in 2014 and concluded that many or most of these 
were post-regulation specialty bulbs.130 On the other hand, the same 
study showed significant reductions in market share for 75 and 100-watt 
incandescent bulbs that were subject to regulation earlier, in 2012 and 
2013.131 This suggests that regulation did decrease consumer use of 
incandescent bulbs, including specialty bulbs. However, because stocks 
of standard incandescent bulbs may have remained available in the years 
immediately following imposition of the standards, it is possible that 
demand for specialty bulbs only increased after 2013. The more recent 
2015 market data cited by the DOE’s 2017 rulemaking suggests 
increasing demand for specialty bulbs, up to 35.5% year-on-year for 
rough service bulbs.132 
Even if there has not been a persistent increase in the sales of 
specialty bulbs, however, there appears to be at least a persistent long 
tail of demand for incandescent bulbs given their continued availability 
in the market. The size of this market, and therefore the extent to which 
it undercuts the efficiency goals of the EISA regulations, may be small, 
but it is not trivial. 
Despite increasing consumer adoption of efficient LED bulbs, 
political fallout from the “bulb ban” persists. A similar EU regulation 
limiting sales of incandescent bulbs even became a minor issue in 
debates surrounding the UK’s decision to exit the EU.133 At least one 
scholar has cited bulb regulation as an example of regulatory overreach 
in a larger critique of the “unbound” administrative state.134 Regulation 
with similar overall economic costs that does not directly affect 
consumers rarely gets such attention. 
IV. GAMING VEHICLE EMISSIONS TESTS 
Perhaps the clearest example of collusion between producers and 
consumers to evade consumer-facing environmental regulation comes 
from a recent study of fuel economy regulations in the European vehicle 
market.135 Partly due to their effect on consumer choice, vehicle 
efficiency and emissions standards are among the most high-profile 
 
 130. See LAURA JAMES ET AL., COLORADO LIGHTING MARKET STUDY 4 (2016), 
https://www.xcelenergy.com/staticfiles/xe/PDF/Regulatory/CO-DSM/CO-Regulatory-DSM-Lighting-
Market-Study.pdf . 
 131. Id. at 24. 
 132. See Energy Conservation Program: Data Collection and Comparison With Forecasted Unit 
Sales of Five Lamp Types; Notice of data availability, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,261 § IV(A) (Apr. 7, 2016). 
 133. See Worstall, supra note 96. 
 134. See Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. Legal Analysis 121 
(2016). 
 135. Reynaert and Sallee, supra note 4. 
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environmental regulations. Almost all developed countries have such 
standards for light-duty vehicles, as do China, Brazil, and some other 
developing countries.136  
However, manufacturer compliance with vehicle emissions standards 
has often been suspect. To give a few examples, General Motors faced 
multimillion-dollar fines and forced recalls of hundreds of thousands of 
Cadillacs in 1995 after design features that evaded carbon monoxide 
tests were discovered.137 In the late 1990s, seven heavy truck 
manufacturers were hit with over $80 million in fines due to discovery 
of devices that shut down emissions controls during highway driving 
conditions.138 In 2014, South Korean automakers Hyundai and Kia 
settled with the EPA after the firms admitted providing incorrect “road 
load force” data to laboratories, leading to inaccurate tests that 
overstated fuel economy.139 Most famously, Volkswagen was busted in 
2015 for implementing software in a large number of diesel vehicles that 
selectively employed emissions controls in test conditions, but disabled 
them in normal driving, increasing fuel economy and performance but 
increasing nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions above legal limits.140 
A recent paper by economists Mathias Reynaert and James Sallee 
uncovered evidence of yet more cheating (or, as they term it, “gaming”) 
of vehicle emissions tests by a wide range of manufacturers subject to 
recently imposed European fuel economy standards.141 Before new fuel 
economy standards were imposed in 2007, the data analyzed by the 
study showed a modest and stable difference between lab-tested fuel 
economy and that in real-world conditions, around 4-18%.142 This 
difference increased to over 50% after standards were imposed, a 
change best explained by manufacturer gaming; in short, the 
manufacturers were designing “to the test” rather than to real-world 
conditions.143 Explaining why this might occur, and what implications it 
might have for regulatory design in the future, requires a deeper look at 
the regulations in question. 
 
 136. See Global Comparison: Light-duty Emissions, TRANSPORT POLICY, 
http://transportpolicy.net/index.php?title=Global_Comparison:_Light-duty_Emissions.  
 137. See Jeff Plungis, Carmaker Cheating on Emissions Almost as Old as Pollution Tests, 
BLOOMBERG (Sep. 23, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-23/carmaker-
cheating-on-emissions-almost-as-old-as-pollution-tests.  
 138. Id. 
 139. See Hyundai and Kia Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA (Nov. 3, 2014), 
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/hyundai-and-kia-clean-air-act-settlement.  
 140. See Learn About Volkswagen Violations, EPA (May 19, 2016), 
https://www.epa.gov/vw/learn-about-volkswagen-violations.  
 141. Reynaert and Sallee, supra note 4. 
 142. Id. at 3.  
 143. Id. 
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A. Private and Public Costs and Benefits of Fuel Economy 
Standards 
Vehicle standards generally set limits on emissions of certain 
pollutants, such as NOx,144 and set minimum fuel economy levels.145 
More efficient vehicles emit less pollution, with their greenhouse gas 
emissions strongly correlated with fuel economy.146 In short, regulators 
imposed standards because the standards generate public benefits in the 
form of reduced air pollution. 
Of course, increased fuel economy also has private benefits for 
vehicle owners—all else equal, consumers prefer more efficient cars. 
But all else is never equal. Fuel economy improvements come at a cost: 
more efficient cars may be more expensive up front, as with CFL and 
LED light bulbs.147 They may also be less appealing to consumers for 
other reasons, such as less attractive styling, slower acceleration, smaller 
size and weight, or other factors.148 For simplicity, these drawbacks of 
more efficient cars will be referred to here as “performance.” 
Consumers (again, all else equal) prefer more efficient cars, and a 
manufacturer offering such vehicles might gain market share, be able to 
charge higher prices, or both. Of course, producing more efficient 
vehicles requires investment in new technology and designs, cutting into 
any profits that might be obtained. If a manufacturer cannot sell a more 
efficient car at a price consumers are willing to pay, it will not be 
attractive, and the firm could lose profits or market share. Like any 
business research and development decision, the best option is rarely 
clear.  
But if manufacturers can cheat on emissions tests, they can get the 
best of both worlds—greater profits and market share without the actual 
 
 144. See, e.g., Light-Duty Vehicles and Light-Duty Trucks: Clean Fuel Fleet Exhaust Emission 
Standards, EPA (March 2016), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100O9ZJ.pdf (detailing 
EPA light-duty vehicle emissions standards for NOx, carbon monoxide, particulate matter, and other 
pollutants).  
 145. See Thomas Klier and Joshua Linn, Comparing US and EU Approaches to Regulating 
Automotive Emissions and Fuel Economy, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, POLICY BRIEF 16-03 (2016), 
http://www.rff.org/files/document/file/RFF-PB-16-03.pdf (describing and contrasting US and EU 
vehicle fuel economy standards). 
 146. See 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,623, 62718 (Oct. 15, 2012) (describing 
close relationship between vehicle fuel economy and CO2 emissions). But see id. at 62891 (discussing 
10% “rebound effect” of increased emissions due to consumers driving more efficient vehicles more).  
 147. See, e.g., Nicholas Chase and John Maples, Fuel economy and average vehicle cost vary 
significantly across vehicle types, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION: TODAY IN ENERGY 
(July 22, 2014), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=17211 (estimating price increase of 
about $2000 for midsize passenger cars to meet 2025 fuel economy standards). 
 148. See DONALD WARREN MACKENZIE, TRENDS AND DRIVERS OF THE PERFORMANCE : FUEL 
ECONOMY TRADEOFF IN NEW AUTOMOBILES (MIT 2009), https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/52758.  
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investment in better fuel economy. This would clearly harm consumers 
who, believing the false claims of fuel economy, would find the vehicle 
more attractive at the time of sale only to find later they have overpaid 
for an inferior product.149  
All of this is true regardless of whether testing and labeling is simply 
voluntary or required by regulation. One might conclude that 
manufacturer cheating on vehicle tests is always detrimental to 
consumers as well as the wider public that is harmed by greater 
emissions. But this is not necessarily the case. In the presence of 
regulatory standards, it may be in consumers’ interest for manufacturers 
to cheat. 
The reason for this depends on a basic principle: fuel economy 
regulations almost always require greater fuel economy than consumers 
prefer on their own. If they did not, there would be no reason for the 
regulation—market forces alone (assuming rational, informed 
consumers) would push fuel economy up to the desired, socially optimal 
or at least beneficial level.150 Therefore, when firms comply with fuel 
economy standards, vehicle consumers likely face private costs that 
exceed the private benefits of fuel economy, in at least three ways.  
First, more efficient cars are likely to be more expensive up front.151 
If this cost exceeds the consumer’s long-term savings from fuel, then 
there is a net private cost. Depending on the amount of increase in up-
front vehicle costs, this might be true for a broad segment of consumers 
or only for those that drive rarely or short distances. Note that the 
regulation might still be cost-benefit justified from a social perspective 
due to the environmental and health benefits of reduced emissions. 
Second, customers with wealth constraints or high discount rates may 
prefer vehicles with lower initial costs even if they would achieve long-
term savings from reduced fuel use. Finally, as mentioned above, there 
is typically a performance-fuel economy tradeoff.152 Even if consumers’ 
total cost of ownership over the life of the car (considering initial cost 
and fuel) is lower, they may nevertheless be worse off if they are forced 
to sacrifice performance characteristics that they value. Consumer utility 
 
 149. See, e.g. Ford Fusion and C-MAX Fuel Economy Litigation, Case No 13-MD-2450 (S.D. NY 
2013), Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, 
http://www.girardgibbs.com/wp-content/uploads/Ford-MPG-Complaint.pdf (detailing claims by owners 
of hybrid vehicles that Ford allegedly overstated the vehicles’ fuel economy).  
 150. This argument assumes that consumers are rational. It is possible that consumers would 
benefit from more efficient vehicles than they think they prefer (and therefore buy), at least for some 
definitions of “benefit.” Compare former Energy Secretary Chu’s claim that light bulb efficiency 
standards “tak[e] away a choice that continues to let people waste their own money.” See Tracy , supra 
note 88. 
 151. See, e.g., EIA, supra note 149. 
 152. See MacKenzie, supra note 148. 
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from vehicle performance is much harder to measure than vehicle or 
fuel cost, but it is no less real. 
Fuel economy rules are therefore likely to impose net private costs on 
vehicle buyers. This can mean manufacturer cheating on emissions tests 
may be beneficial to consumers. In simplest terms, such cheating allows 
customers to opt out of the costly regulation. Vehicles that evade the test 
requirements are likely to be initially cheaper, have better performance, 
or both compared to those that actually achieve the required fuel 
economy. Volkswagen’s infamous NOx test evasion is an example of 
this: meeting NOx emissions requirements under lab conditions but then 
disabling NOx controls under real-world conditions, allowed affected 
VW vehicles to offer performance and fuel economy at a price point that 
competitors found impossible to match.153 
If only one firm cheats on emissions tests, it may be able to capture 
much of the private benefits for itself. For example, such a firm could 
invest less in emissions technology but still sell its cars at market prices, 
increasing profits. As another example, it could capture market share or 
charge above-market prices by offering higher performance vehicles that 
do not actually meet emissions or fuel economy standards. However, if 
any one firm cheats and is able to temporarily secure such an advantage, 
other firms will have a powerful incentive to cheat as well. Reynaert and 
Sallee demonstrate this theory in their paper, modeling a 16% reduction 
in profits if a firm is “honest” while its competitors cheat, compared 
with a 20% increase in profits if the firm is the only one to cheat.154 If all 
firms cheat, the modeled change in profits is quite small in most 
cases.155 This theory illustrates that widespread cheating allows 
consumers to capture more of the benefits of cheaper or better-
performing vehicles. 
Considering solely private costs, consumers stand to benefit most 
from manufacturer cheating if they can identify which manufacturers are 
cheating, and by how much. Consumers may in fact be able to do so, at 
least to some extent. They are not limited to rigid testing procedures, 
and may have real-world knowledge that regulators lack. Independent 
reviews of vehicle fuel economy and performance, word-of-mouth 
information, or information obtained from salespeople may give 
consumers a more accurate picture of true vehicle performance, fuel 
 
 153. See Jeff S. Bartlett, Michelle Naranjo, and Jeff Plungis, Consumer Reports, Guide to the 
Volkswagen Emissions Recall (Jan. 6, 2017), available at 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/cars/guide-to-the-volkswagen-dieselgate-emissions-recall- 
(detailing independent testing showing a decline in fuel economy and acceleration when “cheat” mode 
was enabled on affected VW cars). 
 154. Reynaert, supra note 4) at 35. 
 155. Id. 
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economy, and relevant tradeoffs than data from regulators’ tests. 
Consumers also have access to aggregated real-world data. For example, 
consumers have access to crowd-sourced data through services like 
Fuelly, which provides a platform for vehicle owners to track their fuel 
economy and view aggregated reports on a per-model and per-
manufacturer basis.156 However, consumers can benefit from 
manufacturer cheating even if they are unaware of its extent. At least 
assuming cheating is widespread, consumers will have more vehicles to 
choose from with greater performance at lower cost.  
Of course, some consumers may be disappointed to discover that their 
vehicles do not perform as promised, at least in terms of fuel economy, 
but also in emissions terms if the consumer has green preferences.157 
Even a consumer who openly prefers a less-efficient but cheaper or 
better-performing vehicle would surely prefer to be able to rely on 
manufacturers’ stated performance information. But when regulation 
makes a consumers’ preferred fuel economy/performance/price 
effectively illegal, the ability to buy a vehicle that matches those 
preferences despite falsely claiming to meet the standards will be 
appealing to many.158 In short, vehicle standards motivate manufacturers 
and consumers to collude to evade the regulation. 
The tests themselves create an opportunity to do so. Typically, 
compliance with standards is enforced by testing each model of vehicle 
before it can be sold, rather than by post-sale real-world emissions 
testing. Laboratories conducting tests are generally privately owned and 
often financed by vehicle manufacturers, although they must obtain 
certification from regulators.159 Laboratories also test vehicles in 
narrowly specified conditions in an effort to achieve consistent and 
comparable results.160 This testing regime, however, lends itself to abuse 
or gaming. It is possible for manufacturers to evade regulation if they 
 
 156. See Fuelly.com, Aggregated User Vehicle Data, available at 
http://docs.fuelly.com/aggregated-user-vehicle-data.  
 157. By green preferences, I mean consumer’s private utility function has internalized some or all 
of the emissions externality. 
 158. In other words, for at least some consumers the disutility from being lied to or the increased 
search costs to find a vehicle with preferred real-world performance characteristics will be smaller than 
the utility gain from buying a vehicle that avoids the costs of regulation. This disutility disappears if 
consumers are able to easily discover the true characteristics of a vehicle before purchase. 
 159. See Peter Mock and John German, International Council on Clean Transportation, The 
Future of Vehicle Emissions Testing and Compliance How to Align Regulatory Requirements, Customer 
Expectations, and Environmental Performance in The European Union, White Paper (Nov. 2015) at 9-
15, available at http://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/ICCT_future-vehicle-
testing_20151123.pdf (detailing the common practice among EU member states of licensing private 
testing laboratories, and EPA’s practice of relying on internal manufacturer tests plus government 
testing of about 15% of vehicles). 
 160. Id. (describing lab testing conditions). 
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can achieve emissions or fuel economy standards in the lab 
environment, regardless of their vehicles’ ability to do so on the road. 
Examples of such gaming are common.161  
It is worth noting the obvious reason why evasion of vehicle 
standards is a problem, despite its apparent benefits for both 
manufacturers and consumers. Vehicle emissions have a social welfare 
cost, to the extent that they damage health and the environment. 
Assuming that emissions regulations are socially beneficial, evasion 
reduces social welfare. Consumers get the cars they want; manufacturers 
may get higher revenues and profits; but respiratory disease cases 
increase and climate change is exacerbated. If everyone cheats, the tests 
become an administratively complex and costly form of theater. Even if 
only some cheat, the benefits of the regulation are reduced and the 
credibility of regulators is undercut. 
B. Evidence of Cheating on European Fuel Economy Tests 
Does such cheating actually happen in practice? Is it widespread? 
Reynaert and Sallee claim that the answer to both questions is yes, based 
on analysis of real-world and reported emissions data.162 Their analysis 
compares the stated fuel economy of a wide range of vehicle models 
based on lab test results with real-world fuel economy data obtained 
from a database of Dutch vehicles.163 The data covers the period 
between 2004-2015 with cars dating back to the 1998 model year, a 
particularly useful range because the EU imposed mandatory vehicle 
fuel economy standards in 2008; before 2008, testing was mandatory but 
only voluntary standards were in place.164 The dataset, therefore, 
includes both pre-regulation and post-regulation data, making it a good 
natural experiment. 
The study found that lab tested fuel economy for 1998-2006 model-
year vehicles—those produced before mandatory fuel economy 
standards—was quite close to their on-road fuel economy, differing only 
around 5% in most years, as evinced in Figure 10.165 For 2007-2009 
model-year cars—those produced as the fuel economy regulations enter 
into effect—this average increases, with the difference between lab 
tested and on-road fuel economy growing rapidly for some firms (up to 
 
 161. See Russell Hotten, BBC News, Volkswagen scandal: Are car emissions tests fit for 
purpose? (Sep. 24, 2015), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34340301 (detailing highly 
specific lab testing conditions and opportunities for manufacturer gaming, including removal of wipers, 
mirrors, and spare tires, and taping doors to reduce drag). 
 162. Reynaert, supra  note 4 at 1. 
 163. Id. at 17-18. 
 164. Id. at 15-16. 
 165. Id. at 3. 
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over 30%).166 2010-2014 model year vehicles show very large 
differentiation between lab tested and on-road fuel economy, up to 45% 
for some manufacturers and with no manufacturer lower than about 























Figure 10: On-road and lab tested (official) fuel consumption by vehicle release 
year168 
 
Reynaert and Sallee concluded that these observations were strong 
indicators of manufacturers cheating on lab tests after the imposition of 
mandatory fuel economy standards in 2008.169 Some difference between 
laboratory and on-road fuel economy is expected, but it is difficult to 
explain why this would increase so dramatically after 2008 if it was not 
due to industry manipulation of the tests. As Reynaert and Sallee stated, 
“[t]he rise in the performance gap implies that around 65% of the gains 
in fuel economy as measured by laboratory tests are false.”170 Reynaert 
and Sallee further argued that these results were consistent with 
 
 166. Id. at 22. 
 167. Id. at 22. 
 168. Id. at 3. 
 169. Id. at 1. 
 170. Id. at 3. 
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independent research suggesting, and media reports on manufacturer 
cheating.171  
The authors considered and rejected a few alternative explanations, 
such as a “rebound effect” might lead to customers driving less 
economically (perhaps by using air conditioning more often), eroding 
fuel economy gains and in the process widening the difference between 
lab and real-world fuel economy.172 By cleverly using comparisons with 
diesel vehicles exempt from the fuel economy regulations, they found 
no evidence for such an effect.173 The 2007-2009 period was particularly 
interesting, in that test results and on-road fuel economy diverged 
significantly for only some manufacturers. This suggests that these firms 
began cheating on the tests before their competitors, with other firms 






















Figure 11: Gap between on-road and official fuel consumption by vehicle 
manufacturer174 
 
 171. Id. at 3. 
 172. Id. at 25. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 22. 
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C. Environmental and Political Effects 
For Reynaert and Sallee, this cheating (or, as they are careful to call 
it, “gaming”) behavior by manufacturers is an illustration of 
“Goodhart’s Law”—the maxim that “when an economic measure 
becomes the target of regulation, its measurement accuracy is eroded by 
strategic manipulation.”175 A strong interpretation of Goodhart’s Law 
can lead to policy nihilism, but even if one does not go that far the 
manipulation it implies can severely undercut policy goals. As noted 
above, Reynaert and Sallee estimate that 65% of the improvement in 
fuel economy of European vehicles attributed to the 2008 fuel economy 
standards was in fact the illusory result of manufacturers cheating on the 
tests.176 At a social cost of carbon of $40/ton, the fuel economy 
standards generate $1.2 billion less in annual benefits due to cheating.177 
However, as discussed above, individual vehicle buyers likely benefit 
from this cheating. It is unclear to what extent buyers may know or 
suspect that on-road fuel economy of vehicles will not match 
manufacturers’ claims, much less the degree to which consumers may 
be aware that this gap has increased in recent years. But, as noted, 
consumers need not be aware of cheating to benefit from it. Cheating 
allows manufacturers to supply vehicles with better performance (in 
terms of factors other than fuel economy), very likely at a lower price 
than models that actually met the standards under road conditions. 
Consumers could demand vehicles that actually have real-world fuel 
economy that matches or approaches stated and required fuel economy, 
but they do not appear to be doing so.178 Whether they are aware of it or 
not, consumers and manufacturers are effectively able to cooperate to 
substantially avoid the EU fuel economy rules. In addition to the loss in 
public benefits from emissions reductions, this risks undercutting 
regulators’ credibility, especially considering the high-profile discovery 
of evasion of similar lab tests for NOx emissions by Volkswagen in 
2015. 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
These case studies provide three examples of evasion of 
environmental regulations benefiting manufacturers and product 
 
 175. Id. at 1. 
 176. Id. at 3. 
 177. Id. 
 178. It is possible that consumer preferences will change if the degree of manufacturer evasion 
becomes widely known, but there is little evidence of such a change 6-8 years after the regulation 
entered into effect. 
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consumers while reducing broader environmental and health benefits 
(sometimes substantially). The level of cooperation between consumers 
and the industry, and the degree of evasion vary, however. In the case of 
gas can regulations, there is strong evidence of widespread evasion of 
the regulations and some evidence of industry-consumer cooperation in 
such efforts, although there is only modest evidence of major 
manufacturers producing products to evade the rules. With light bulbs, 
in contrast, there is open marketing of products circumventing the 
incandescent ban by major manufacturers (rough-service bulbs) to 
holdout consumers, but this market appears to be small, with little effect 
on overall efficiency gains (perhaps because CFLs and LEDs have 
become dominant regardless of regulation). The Reynaert and Sallee 
study provides evidence of widespread and significant evasion of a 
major environmental regulation, benefiting vehicle manufacturers and 
consumers at the expense of the public, although evidence of consumer 
knowledge of the degree of evasion is mixed. 
In each of these cases, there are two costs of evasion. One, as noted, 
is reduced benefits of regulation, i.e., more pollution than anticipated. 
This reduction in benefits can be large: for evasion of the European 
vehicle fuel economy standards, Reynaert and Sallee foudn that 65% of 
alleged benefits were not realized due to evasion.179 Similar data for gas 
can and light bulb regulations is not available, but anecdotal evidence 
suggests widespread evasion that necessarily means at least some 
reduction in benefits. More quantitative study of the effects of consumer 
evasion of regulation is undoubtedly needed. 
There is another, deeper risk of consumer-facing regulation: reduced 
political credibility. As vividly illustrated by consumer complaints about 
gas can and light bulb regulations, environmental rules that directly 
affect consumers may inspire greater pushback and dissatisfaction than 
“traditional” environmental regulations focused on large firms with 
similar economic costs, as traditionally calculated. When consumer-
facing regulations are evaded, not only has a regulator expended 
political capital to implement an underperforming rule, it also risks 
undercutting its long-run credibility.  
Consumers who fumble with new gas cans and spill fuel, who see 
their neighbors hacking their cans to add vents or repurposing water 
cans for fuel, who see incandescent bulbs available in stores despite a 
“ban”, and who conclude that car fuel economy tests are not credible are 
all unlikely to take environmental regulations or regulators seriously. 
This plays into preexisting critiques of environmental regulators as 
meddling and incompetent bureaucrats, solidifying that narrative to an 
 
 179. Reynaert, supra note 4 at 3. 
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extent that may be difficult to counteract no matter how much evidence 
of regulatory successes elsewhere is offered. This is exacerbated further 
if consumers are not aware of evasion, even if they privately benefit 
from it; consumers assume regulation is effective, and may blame 
regulators for problems with products or for price increases, while 
manufacturer evasion undercuts the regulation’s environmental benefits. 
If consumers then discover the evasion, they may add incompetence to 
their list of complaints about regulators, but they are unlikely to 
retroactively lift blame from regulators for product and price complaints. 
In democracies, political creditability of administrative agencies and 
other regulators matters. Elected officials are unlikely to fund or give 
regulatory powers to agencies that are not trusted and respected by the 
electorate. Agencies also depend on support from the executive and the 
judiciary for effective regulation, and both may be influenced by public 
views. 
To be clear, none of this is to suggest that there should necessarily be 
less regulation overall, or even that consumer-facing regulation is 
always unwise. When CARB, and later the EPA, decided to regulate gas 
cans, they were, by all evidence, generally doing what good regulators 
should: continually updating their regulations in response to new 
information and choosing the regulatory tool and target based on their 
best cost/benefit estimation. This Article’s critique here is narrower: 
regulators are less likely to accurately anticipate the economic, 
administrative, and political costs associated with consumer-facing 
regulation, and are, therefore, likely to find it more attractive in cost-
benefit terms than it really should be. The next section addresses how 
regulators can respond to these challenges. 
VI. WHAT CAN REGULATORS DO? 
In short, regulations with direct (i.e. non-price) effects on consumers 
both create disproportionate political opposition and opportunities for 
consumers and industry to collude to evade them, reducing public 
benefits. This does not mean, however, that regulators should avoid 
consumer-facing regulations entirely. Consumer products and the 
choices consumers make between them can and do have serious 
consequences, with road vehicle purchase decisions being the most 
obvious environmental example. Eschewing regulation of these products 
entirely is probably unrealistic; but regulators can do more to avoid 
unintentionally creating incentives for consumers and industry to evade 
such regulations. This section discusses ways that regulators can do so 
by changing the tools they use or the target of their regulations. It is 
worth noting at the outset, however, that none of these solutions is 
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perfect—all have drawbacks of their own that may overwhelm their 
advantages in terms of reducing incentives to evade. Unsurprisingly, 
regulators face tough choices. The goal here is merely to discuss how a 
previously undervalued factor—incentives to collaboratively evade 
regulation, and the political consequences thereof—should play into 
regulator decision-making. 
A. Attack Evasion Directly 
One option is for regulators to directly regulate attempted evasion and 
collusion . Doing so is a standard feature of regulation, both when 
initially written and continually through the life of a rule. But countering 
evasion requires administrative resources, imposes political costs, and 
can never be perfect. 
To the extent that regulators anticipate an easy method of evasion, 
they will likely address it in the initial regulation. Vehicle safety 
regulations not only require seatbelts, but also require alerts that flash or 
sound if the car is driven without seatbelts buckled, which cannot be 
easily disabled by drivers.180 Product-design regulations themselves can 
be seen as regulatory attempts to block easy routes of consumer evasion. 
For example, in response to the VOC emissions problem from gas cans 
the EPA and CARB could have regulated gas can use rather than design, 
perhaps by requiring users to keep vents closed when pouring gas, or to 
buy and install replacement low-emissions spouts. Regulators likely 
concluded that such measures would be less effective than requiring 
low-emissions can designs because use regulations would be easily  
evaded and impossible to enforce against a large number of consumers. 
If it is impossible to regulate how a product is used, regulating its 
design, and therefore limiting customer choice, becomes much more 
attractive, and may be the only realistic option available to regulators. 
Regulators cannot anticipate all evasion in advance, however, and, 
therefore, must often respond to evasion they discover only after 
regulations are issued. A variety of regulator strategies are available 
here. Many regulations do not explicitly ban circumvention attempts, 
forcing regulators to revise the rules as consumers discover ways to 
evade them. CARB’s decision to revise its regulations to include cans 
labeled for kerosene and so-called utility cans are examples of such 
responses.181 Regulators may eventually decide to regulate cans labeled 
 
 180. See 49 C.F.R. §571.208 S7.3 (requiring audible or visual alert car is started without seatbelts 
fastened). 
 181. See California Air Resources Board, New Requirements for Kerosene Containers (Oct 2005), 
available at https://www.arb.ca.gov/enf/advs/advs338.pdf, California Air Resources Board, Clarified 
Requirements for Utility Jugs (Dec. 2005), available at https://www.arb.ca.gov/enf/advs/advs342.pdf. 
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for water use in the same way, or to ban aftermarket gas can 
modification kits. These ex-post efforts undoubtedly reduce evasion to 
some extent, but they are a “red queen’s race”—there is no limit to 
consumer ingenuity. 
Alternatively, some statutes and regulations forbid attempts to evade. 
The most well-known of such limitations is probably the Clean Air 
Act’s ban on “defeat devices.”182 Of course, forbidding evasion does not 
mean it will not happen, however, as the repeated violations of the 
defeat device provision described above vividly illustrate. Regulators 
must verify manufacturer compliance, usually through government or 
third-party testing requirements. Such testing adds to the cost of 
regulation, and may still be ineffective at detecting evasion, as 
evidenced by Reynaert and Sallee’s study of emissions cheating in the 
European auto market suggests. Here too, there is an iterative arms race 
between regulators and manufacturers. 
Ever more onerous regulations and testing requirements also likely 
increase the political cost of regulation. Anti-evasion designs may prove 
ever more unfriendly to users. Regulators may cause collateral 
damage—kerosene cans were initially unregulated, presumably because 
CARB determined the cost of doing so was not worth the benefits. But 
after kerosene cans were included in revised regulations to prevent 
evasion of the gas can standards, users of kerosene cans were subjected 
to the same frustrating designs. The light bulb regulations attempted to 
avoid this collateral damage problem by exempting “rough service” and 
other specialized bulbs, but at the cost of leaving open an easy route for 
regulatory evasion. 
As these examples illustrate, regulators face tough choices. Fail to 
address evasion, and the benefits of regulation may be rapidly eroded, if 
they are ever realized at all. But zealous pursuit of evasion may carry 
large administrative and political costs, as well as increasing the 
economic cost of regulations beyond the optimal level. Reputational 
factors matter too: regulators want to earn a reputation for being tough 
but fair, so as to deter cheating while promoting compliance. 
None of this is easy, and as the gas can regulations illustrate, a 
process of continual revision of regulations and testing requirements is 
necessary. Such regular revision is difficult enough for regulators, but 
may effectively be impossible where standards are set by legislatures. 
 
 182. See 42 U.S.C. §7522(a)(3)(A) (illegal to “manufacture or sell, or offer to sell, or install, any 
part or component intended for use with, or as part of, any motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine, where 
a principal effect of the part or component is to bypass, defeat, or render inoperative any device or 
element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine in compliance with 
regulations”). 
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B. Adopt More Flexible Regulatory Tools 
Another option available to regulators anticipating evasion of 
consumer-facing regulation is to change regulatory tools. Much 
consumer-facing regulation is traditional command-and-control. 
CARB’s initial ban on vented gas cans is a typical example. But other 
regulatory tools are available: performance standards or externality 
pricing might be more cost-effective while also reducing administrative 
and political costs by preserving some degree of consumer (and 
manufacturer) choice. They are not without important drawbacks, 
however. 
1. Performance Standards 
Performance standards, as the name indicates, require a specified 
level of performance, rather than adoption of a particular design or 
practice as command-and-control regulation would require. For 
example, a factory might be required to emit no more than a specified 
amount of a pollutant under a performance standard, rather than 
installing a regulator-specified scrubber device under a command-and-
control rule. Performance standards also have a number of advantages. 
They are more responsive to differing on-the-ground circumstances (or, 
conversely, less sensitive to regulators’ lack of good information); and 
they maintain incentives to innovate: if techniques can be found for 
complying with regulation at lower cost or while maintaining or 
improving other performance metrics, they will be adopted. 
In the context of consumer-facing regulations, the advantages of 
performance standards over command-and-control are readily apparent. 
Faced with command-and-control product design standards, 
manufacturers have no choice but to supply compliant products, even if 
consumers find them less useful. If regulations are performance 
standards, however, manufacturers can innovate to produce products 
with better performance and utility that still meet the standards.  
Many consumer-facing regulations recognize this benefit of 
performance standards, including of course the largest such program—
vehicle emissions standards. Vehicle manufacturers must only ensure 
their vehicle fleets comply with the emissions standards; they are free to 
innovate on vehicle design, performance, and efficiency. The result has 
been steady improvement in vehicles across many dimensions important 
to consumers while (usually) complying with standards that have 
tightened over time. The 2007 EISA also used performance standards to 
regulate light bulbs, with an additional and common wrinkle: the 
standards increased over time, allowing manufacturers time to innovate 
and consumers time to adapt. Even gas can regulations have moved 
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toward performance standards as well, with CARB’s revised regulations 
eschewing command-and-control in favor of a performance standard. In 
short, all three of the regulatory programs discussed above began as 
performance standards or evolved in that direction. 
This evolution, however, illustrates a limitation of performance 
standards. Where evolution has occurred, it is not clear that the 
performance standards were meaningfully different from the earlier 
command-and-control rules—there is little apparent evidence of 
improved gas can designs that comply with the performance standards 
but which would have been illegal under the original command-and-
control rules. If performance standards are too strict, or if there are 
simply no options available for manufacturers to innovate, then they are 
effectively indistinguishable from command-and-control rules. Put 
simply, if there’s only one way to achieve the standard (e.g., removing 
secondary vents from gas cans) then the regulation is effectively a 
command-and-control rule requiring that approach. It is the flexibility 
inherent in well-designed performance standards, not their form alone, 
that gives them their advantages. 
Moreover, enforcement of performance standards is more difficult. 
Instead of simply verifying whether designs meet stated command-and-
control requirements, regulators must test them for compliance with the 
standards. These tests may be expensive, with costs likely borne by 
manufacturers and, ultimately, by consumers. As the experience with 
vehicle emissions standards shows, these tests are themselves vulnerable 
to cheating and evasion. Testing regimes can and should be improved; 
but here too there are drawbacks. For example, EPA’s gas can emissions 
tests require all vents to be open during testing, on the assumption that 
customers are likely to leave them open in actual use.183 This testing 
requirement effectively bans vents because meeting the performance 
standards with open vents is impossible, at least for current designs. In 
this way, strict testing requirements, just like strict performance 
standards, effectively become command-and-control requirements. To 
consumers, the two are indistinguishable. In fact, if there is enough 
cheating or if administrative costs of testing are sufficiently high, 
command-and-control regulation might be superior, i.e., both more cost-
effective and no less likely to promote evasion and consumer discontent. 
More broadly, advising regulators to move toward performance 
standards for consumer-facing regulation is not that helpful for the 
simple reason that such regulations already are performance standards. 
To put it a different way, regulating with performance standards may 
reduce incentives to evade regulation and their political cost, but 
 
 183. See EPA PFC Rule at 8500. 
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persistent evasion and consumer discontent show it clearly cannot 
eliminate either problem. 
2. Pricing Externalities 
An even more flexible regulatory option is for regulators to simply 
price the negative externality a regulation is intended to address. Instead 
of limiting harmful conduct directly with command-and-control 
regulations, such an approach permits the conduct, so long as the 
regulated parties are willing to pay. The two simplest forms of such 
regulation are Pigouvian taxes and cap-and-trade. Under the former, the 
regulator sets a price for the externality (such as units of emissions) that 
must be paid. Under the latter, the regulator fixes a quantity and allows 
trading of credits totaling that fixed quantity, with the market setting the 
credit’s price. In simplest terms, therefore, the regulator either sets the 
price or quantity of the externality. Carbon taxes and cap-and-trade for 
greenhouse gases are the most well-known examples of these regulatory 
tools, but they are not necessarily restricted to large-scale air pollution.  
In principle, regulators could tax the sale price of vehicles based on 
their emissions performance, rather than forbidding sale of those that 
fail to meet performance standards. Or, in a crude version of cap-and-
trade, CARB could allow sales of only a limited number of vented gas 
cans per year, with the market setting their price. Hybrid performance 
standard/externality pricing approaches are also possible. For example, 
the EPA could set a target fleet average fuel economy for vehicle 
manufacturers, but let manufacturers trade credits to meet it (with over-
complying manufacturers trading credits to those that fail to meet the 
target). This, in fact, is more or less how the EPA’s current fuel 
economy standards work.184 
To an even greater extent than a similarly stringent performance 
standard, externality pricing incentivizes innovation and preserves 
consumer choice. If a manufacturer can design a more efficient light 
bulb, lower-emissions gas can, or cleaner vehicle, it can pay lower taxes 
or buy fewer credits. These savings may be passed on to consumers. 
Similarly, a consumer that strongly prefers an old-style vented gas can 
would still be able to buy one under a tax, but would have to pay more 
for it than for an unvented low-emissions can. Consumers that love the 
warm glow of incandescent light bulbs, or need their heat for an Easy-
Bake oven, could still buy them, but at a higher price than they would 
 
 184. See Benjamin Leard and Virginia A. McConnell, New Markets Under US Vehicle Fuel 
Efficiency and Greenhouse Gas Standards: Credit Trading, Resources (Sep. 24, 2015), available at 
http://www.rff.org/research/publications/new-markets-under-us-vehicle-fuel-efficiency-and-greenhouse-
gas-standards (describing how modern fleet fuel economy standards allow inter-manufacturer trading). 
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have paid before the pricing regulation. Consumers would surely 
grumble about price increases, but, as discussed above, restricting 
choice by regulation seems to inspire much greater dissatisfaction than 
mere price increases. 
Externality pricing may also reduce incentives to evade regulation. 
For example, Reynaert and Sallee showed that car manufacturers would 
have had no incentive to cheat on EU emissions regulations had they 
come in the form of higher fuel taxes (Europe’s traditional approach) 
rather than US-style emissions standards.185 As they said, “gaming 
offers an opportunity to avoid a regulation but not a fuel tax, which 
breaks the symmetry and provides an enforcement rationale for 
preferring the tax over a regulation.”186 To illustrate why, consider the 
standard example of cheating: a manufacturer that produces a vehicle 
with lower actual fuel economy than indicated by lab testing, but better 
performance or a lower cost to the manufacturer than would be possible 
if the vehicle truly had the tested fuel economy. Under a performance 
standard, the vehicle slips through the testing, and consumers can get a 
vehicle they prefer (because of its lower price or better performance) but 
would not otherwise be able to buy. With a fuel tax instead of a 
performance standard, however, all customers get is a vehicle with 
greater cost of operation than was apparent when they bought it. Sure, 
the vehicle does have better performance or lower cost, but in the 
absence of the performance standard, customers could have just 
purchased such a vehicle with those characteristics and with accurate 
information on fuel economy. In short, what was mutually beneficial 
consumer-producer collusion under a performance standard becomes 
consumer-harming false advertising under a fuel tax.  
Note that in principle the regulator, acting on behalf of the public in 
general, is indifferent between the two options—the goal is reduced 
emissions, not a particular mix of vehicles on the road or price of fuel. 
Therefore, if one option is subject to not only cheating but also collusive 
(and presumably more lucrative) cheating, and the other is not, that is an 
important advantage for the latter. 
This advantage is not necessarily dispositive, however. Externality 
pricing has its disadvantages, and is ill-suited to some types of 
externalities. Most obviously, externality pricing still requires similar 
compliance testing to performance standards. If high-emitting vehicles 
or gas cans are subject to a tax, for example, regulators must still test 
vehicles and gas cans to determine their emissions and, therefore, their 
tax. These tests are as equally subject to manufacturer evasion (though 
 
 185. Reynaert, supra note 4 at 12. 
 186. Id. 
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not consumer-producer collusive evasion) as those for performance 
standards.  
Moreover, incentives to evade may remain after products have been 
sold and the tax paid. The above discussion of fuel taxes shows that such 
incentives may be reduced, but they do not go away entirely. For 
example, if old-style vented gas cans are taxed—making them more 
expensive than new-style cans—some consumers may still buy the 
cheaper new-style cans and modify them to evade the regulation. Instead 
of modifying the cans to get features barred by regulation, they would 
be modifying them to avoid the tax. To be sure, it will not be worth the 
time, the effort, and the cost (the “No-Bama” aftermarket vent kit retails 
for $13.95 plus shipping)187 for many consumers to modify untaxed 
new-style cans. However, these consumers presumably would also not 
evade command-and-control regulations by modifying cans.  
It is also possible that evasion of a tax has a different moral valence 
or reputational effect than avoiding a command-and-control rule. 
Avoiding traditional income tax and other taxes is widely seen as 
freeloading—failing to pay one’s fair share of the benefits of 
government. In principle, avoiding externality taxes should be seen the 
same way—failing to pay for the costs one’s behavior imposes on 
others. Avoiding minor regulations, from speed limits to gas can 
modifications, seems not to carry the same social stigma, even if those 
rules are similarly aimed at reducing costs imposed on others (risk of 
traffic accidents or VOC pollution, respectively).  
The perceptive reader will have noted some tension between the 
previous paragraph and Reynaert and Sallee’s claim, discussed above, 
that switching to a fuel tax would eliminate manufacturer’s incentive to 
cheat on emissions standards. Does externality pricing eliminate evasion 
incentives or not? The answer, of course, is that it depends, for reasons 
discussed further in the next subsection. Some other points about 
externality pricing are worth making first, however. 
Another problem is that the target price or quantity can be difficult for 
regulators to determine. This is true generally; it is hard to know what 
level of tax will lead to sufficient emissions reductions to achieve 
desired benefits, or how low to set an emissions cap without driving up 
credit prices so high that the regulation’s costs exceed its benefits. There 
are also specific reasons why externality pricing for consumer products 
is difficult.  
The largest such problem is monitoring. Regulators generally can 
only interact with consumer decisions at the time of purchase. An 
 
 187. No-Bama Replacement Spout & Vent Kit, alaskansongs.com, available at 
http://alaskansongs.com/product/no-bama-replacement-spout-vent-kit/. 
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emissions tax is paid, if at all, when a product (say a gas can or light 
bulb) is initially bought.188 There is no practical way for a regulator to 
monitor use or emissions through a product’s life, and adjust the tax 
accordingly, even though the externality imposed may differ greatly 
between consumers. A gas can used daily by a landscaping company is 
likely to lead to much greater VOC emissions, for example, than a can 
used only once a year for an emergency generator.  The efficiency 
benefits of a light bulb in a light that stays on most of the time are far 
greater than those for, say, a closet light that is used a few hours a year. 
The best regulators can do for consumer products is to set the tax based 
on an estimate of average usage. However, consumers have better 
information and will act on it. The landscaper is much more likely to 
pay the tax for an old-style gas can than the generator user, and will, 
therefore, have much higher VOC emissions. Taxes on large industrial 
emitters, rather than consumers, do not generally have these problems 
because regulators can monitor emissions and tax them on an ongoing 
basis, rather than by estimating in advance. 
Externality pricing may also be a poor fit for some regulatory goals. 
For example, if the purpose of regulation is paternalistic or is to mitigate 
impacts of customers’ bounded rationality, rather than externality-
reducing, pricing will not work. Take seatbelts, for example. Allowing 
customers to buy a car without seatbelts (or with the ability to disable 
seatbelt alarms) on payment of a tax defeats the purpose of the 
regulation. Light bulb efficiency standards might arguably be justified 
on the grounds that they save consumers money in the long run, but that 
consumers’ irrationally high discount rates or status-quo biases prevent 
them from appreciating and realizing these savings. If so, allowing 
customers to escape the efficiency standards by paying a higher price on 
incandescent bulbs due to a tax might make the problem worse. The 
price increase might cause some customers to reassess their decision and 
buy a more efficient CFL or LED, while others might just keep buying 
the same bulbs they always have and pay more for them.189 
A final and more practical drawback of externality pricing is that 
traditional regulatory statutes often do not give regulators the authority 
to implement them. The Clean Air Act, for example, generally allows 
the EPA only to set health or technology-based regulations and 
standards, although it does allow states to use market-based tools to 
 
 188. More likely, it is paid when the product is produced, with the cost then passed on to the 
consumer at the time of sale. 
 189. Of course, consumers who persist in buying incandescent bulbs might not be irrational at all, 
rather they may have rational reasons not considered by regulators, like high perceived search costs—
i.e., they hate shopping or change—or a preference for incandescent bulb characteristics other than 
efficiency. 
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comply with EPA standards.190 This means legislative action is likely 
necessary for regulators to adopt large-scale externality pricing for 
consumer-facing regulation. 
3. Change the Point of Compliance 
If fuel taxes make cheating on emissions standards less attractive, 
why do taxes on gas cans necessarily make aftermarket consumer 
modifications similarly unattractive? The answer is that there is a bit of 
sleight-of-hand in the fuel tax example. Switching from vehicle 
emissions standards to a fuel tax involves both a change in regulatory 
tool (performance standard to Pigouvian tax) and a shift in the 
regulation’s point of compliance (from manufacturers to fuel sellers or, 
practically, to consumers themselves).  
It is the latter shift that is doing most of the work in making evasion 
less attractive. Neither consumers nor manufacturers have much ability 
to avoid a fuel tax. More precisely, they do not have any way to avoid it 
without also reducing their emissions and thereby fulfilling the goals of 
the regulation—manufacturers can make more efficient vehicles, and 
consumers can drive less, but neither is “evasion” in any meaningful 
sense. 
In contrast, regulations on product design—whether command-and-
control, performance standards, or taxes—can be evaded. Manufacturers 
may produce designs that evade regulators’ tests, possibly colluding 
with consumers to do so, or consumers may evade the regulations on 
their own by making post-sale (and therefore post-testing) 
modifications.  This difference arises from two facts. First, fuel 
consumption (for vehicles or for fuel stored in cans) is closely correlated 
with emissions, much more so than vehicle or can design is. Second, as 
discussed above, tests of designs can be evaded while measurements of 
fuel consumption generally cannot (black-market fuel purchases aside).  
As noted above, externality prices on product designs are necessarily 
based on an estimate of the externality imposed by use of a product, 
which can vary greatly among users. It is often impossible to measure 
the externalities imposed by consumer products on an ongoing basis. 
But in some cases this measurement is possible—most obviously when 
the externalities come not from the use of the product itself, but from the 
consumption (or waste through evaporation) of the fuel. It is gasoline, 
and the pollutants it contains or produces on combustion, that is the 
 
 190. See 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(2)(A) (directing states to include “enforceable emission limitations” 
in their state plans for compliance with federally-set air quality standards, and further defining such 
emission limitations to include “economic incentives such as fees, marketable permits, and auctions of 
emissions rights”). 
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environmental problem addressed by vehicle and gas can fuel standards. 
It should, therefore, come as no surprise that regulating gasoline directly 
(through fuel taxes) should prove a more effective regulatory tool.  
To generalize, regulators may reduce both incentives to evade 
regulation and a great deal of the political and administrative costs of 
consumer-facing rules by shifting the regulatory point of compliance 
closer to the source of the externality. This intuition is applicable 
beyond gasoline. For example, a tax on electricity might better 
incentivize customers to switch to more efficient light bulbs (and other 
appliances). Such a tax would be suboptimal, however, because it is not 
electricity itself but the pollution associated with its generation that 
leads to negative externalities. Taxes, therefore, on the production or 
combustion of polluting fuels in proportion to their environmental 
impact (most notably coal) would almost certainly be more cost-
effective, easier to administer, and more politically acceptable than light 
bulb phase-outs. Of course, such taxes would increase the cost of 
electricity for consumers, but without restricting consumer choice. 
While pricing fuel externalities appears to be a better choice than the 
three consumer-facing regulations discussed here, it is no panacea. 
Many externality problems do not have such ready opportunities to shift 
the point of regulation. Take, for example, regulations aimed at reducing 
water usage. Design regulations such as low-flow toilets and 
showerheads are one option, but another is to increase the price of water 
delivered to homes. That may work in cities, but in rural areas that use 
well water there is no easy way to tax overall water consumption. Other 
externality problems, like discarded plastic bags, lack any clear point of 
compliance other than the product itself. 
Moreover, different uses of the same fuel may have very different 
environmental costs. The environmental effects of evaporating fuel from 
vented gas cans are different from those of combustion byproducts of 
burned fuels, and those combustion byproducts vary depending on a 
variety of factors, including when and where the emissions occur and 
the characteristics of the engine using the fuel. In other words, there is 
often no single measure of externalities associated with a fuel, and any 
externality price set by regulators will almost certainly be less than the 
external costs imposed by some uses. A case for regulating product 
designs related to these high-external-cost uses therefore persists, and in 
these cases we are back where we started. 
C. Pick Your Battles—Or Be More Subtle 
There appears to be no way to completely avoid the problems of 
consumer-facing regulation. Regulators will always face some risk of 
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evasion and some degree of political backlash. Consumer-facing 
regulations perhaps inevitably have lower benefits (due to greater 
evasion) and higher costs (if political and administrative costs are 
included) than equivalent industry-only regulations. An overly simple 
response would be for regulators to eschew consumer-facing regulations 
entirely. To some extent this has been regulators’ historic approach. Air 
pollution regulations initially focused on large stationary sources, 
typically operated by large firms. This is likely because regulators 
correctly perceived that the administrative, and perhaps also political, 
costs of regulating a few large emitters were smaller than regulating 
many small sources of emissions, including consumer products. 
Over time, however, the lowest-hanging fruit has been picked while 
achieving health and environmental benefits continues to require greater 
emissions reductions. Regulating so-called “area sources” and consumer 
products, therefore, has become more attractive to regulators.191 This 
trend can be clearly seen in California’s efforts to reduce tropospheric 
ozone, initially with regulations on point sources, then with vehicle 
emissions standards, and eventually with consumer products like paints 
and gas cans. 
1. Do Not Regulate Consumers at All? 
Regulators are not naïve—they are more aware than anyone that it is 
easier and less controversial in most cases to regulate a few industry 
actors than many consumers and their purchase decisions. But they have 
nevertheless concluded in many cases that consumer-facing regulation is 
justified, and superior to alternatives that may be available, such as 
tighter restrictions on already-regulated industrial sources, or simply not 
regulating at all and accepting current health and environmental 
conditions. 
Some evidence from the case studies above suggests, however, that 
regulators may underappreciate the costs of consumer-facing regulation. 
Evasion of testing by manufacturers appears common or at least 
frequent, and while better testing regimes are surely needed, they may 
not be able to substantially reduce evasion without large increases in 
regulators’ administrative costs. Enforcement against consumer evasion 
(such as home modification of gas cans) seems impractical in most 
contexts. Consumer discontent with choice-limiting regulation seems 
disproportionately high relative to regulators estimates of program cost. 
Regulators could learn from these experiences and update their 
 
 191. An alternative, cynical explanation is that some industries were able to organize and exert 
sufficient political pressure that caused regulators to conclude that the political costs of consumer-facing 
regulation were lower than those for continued industry-facing regulation. 
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models and heuristics accordingly. Regulators always anticipate some 
degree of enforcement failure, administrative cost, and political backlash 
to regulations, and include these costs (formally or informally) in their 
decision-making processes.192 These ex ante cost estimates should be 
continually revised based on experience with similar past regulations. 
Ideally, it would be possible to predict and quantify lost benefits due to 
evasion and increased costs due to higher administrative burdens, and 
include these estimates in cost-benefit analysis; however, these may be 
difficult to predict with any precision, and political costs may be 
impossible to quantify. Regulators do not have it easy, but they do 
regularly consider unquantifiable benefits.193 Perhaps some 
psychological costs to consumers in terms of lost choice, forced change 
in habits, and other sources of consumer discontent should be treated as 
unquantifiable costs and similarly incorporated into regulatory 
decisions. 
It is unsurprising that regulators appear to underestimate regulatory 
costs imposed on consumers. Small costs imposed on many consumers 
throughout the economy, each of them using products in idiosyncratic 
ways, are likely to be hard to estimate and aggregate. Moreover, 
regulators probably do not get reliable information from consumers 
during the regulatory process. If regulators propose a rule affecting large 
firms or a well-organized industry, they can count on robust 
participation from industry in the notice-and-comment rulemaking 
process. In theory, this participation will identify any costs or 
inefficiencies regulators failed to initially appreciate, and final rules can 
be revised accordingly. However, individual consumers are unlikely to 
know regulations affecting them and the products they buy have been 
proposed, are unlikely to know how to participate in notice-and-
comment, and are unlikely to have the resources to or interest in doing 
so. Regulators will, therefore, be deprived of information on costs of 
consumer-facing regulation that might have led to revisions in final 
rules. 
Even if one takes a more cynical view of the notice-and-comment 
process as merely a venue for rent-seeking behavior, results are similar. 
Industry lobbyists will be able to shape rules ex-ante in notice-and-
comment (or even through ex parte communications with agency 
officials), while consumers will not be able to similarly participate. 
Regulators will, therefore, see the political costs of industry regulation 
 
 192. See, e.g. 2017 DOE Bulb Standards, supra note 108 at 7291 (revising initial regulations to 
foreclose the easiest methods of consumer evasion via substitution of excluded light bulb types, while 
maintaining other exclusions despite awareness that some substitution is likely to persist).  
 193. See, e.g. EPA PFC Rule, supra note 1 at 8513 (detailing unquantified health and 
environmental benefits from reduced emissions from fuel containers). 
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but fail to appreciate those costs for consumer-facing rules. Viewed in 
this way, loud consumer dissatisfaction in response to choice-restricting 
rules can be seen as the ex-post rent-seeking equivalent of ex-ante 
agency lobbying. 
Another view is that under appreciation of the costs of consumer-
facing regulation is a symptom of a wider problem: regulators’ general 
failure to retrospectively review the effectiveness (costs and benefits) of 
past regulations, or, to be more charitable to regulators, executive failure 
to lead and legislative failure to direct and fund such efforts. If 
regulators rarely or never review past consumer-facing regulations, the 
risks and costs of evasion and political backlash are likely to be 
underappreciated. If they are understood by regulators, it will likely be 
in an anecdotal, institutional memory sense, rather than in any 
systematic way, making it hard to apply lessons to future rulemaking. 
To make this suggestion more concrete, imagine CARB conducted a 
retrospective review of its gas can regulations, including updated 
emissions estimates taking into account observed consumer and 
consumer-producer evasion, as well as harder-to-quantify lessons like 
anecdotal evidence of consumer backlash. Such a review would be 
likely to influence CARB’s future marginal decisions on what emissions 
sources to regulate. Again, this is not to suggest that CARB would as a 
result eschew consumer-facing regulation entirely, but rather that future 
decisions on whether to do so would be better informed. 
Sometimes such greater appreciation of the costs of consumer-facing 
regulation will, however, lead regulators to decide against regulating a 
product at all. This does not necessarily mean more air pollution or other 
externalities, however; it just means regulators will choose another 
target. CARB regulated gas cans because it determined that it was the 
most cost-effective way to achieve marginal reductions in VOC air 
pollution at the time. CARB could instead have imposed further 
regulations on other VOC sources, such as industrial facilities, and 
might have done so had it anticipated the extent to which consumers 
would evade the gas can rules (or the degree to which consumer/citizens 
would be inconvenienced by the rules). Finally, perhaps CARB would 
have gone ahead with the gas can rules anyway, but it would have done 
so based on better information. 
2. Consumer-Transparent Regulation 
Another regulatory response is to regulate aspects of consumer 
products that are transparent to consumers. If a design characteristic is 
completely transparent, it is perceived by consumers only as a price 
increase. For example, CARB and the EPA’s gas can regulations 
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undoubtedly make gas cans harder to use by requiring complex spouts 
and removal of vents. It is end users who must bear this burden, but the 
regulations also require gas can manufacturers to use less permeable 
materials, thereby reducing the rate at which stored fuel evaporates from 
closed containers. Presumably the less permeable materials are more 
expensive (or manufacturers would have already used them), so the 
permeability regulations probably do drive up the cost of cans 
incrementally. But consumers are not otherwise burdened—in contrast 
to spout and vent changes, this change is largely or perhaps completely 
transparent to consumers. A plastic gas can is more or less a plastic gas 
can. It is possible that CARB and the EPA could have achieved the 
emissions reductions they predicted from spout and vent changes by 
imposing even-stricter permeability standards, or by regulating other 
consumer-transparent (or lower-consumer-impact) emissions-reducing 
aspects of cans. 
3. Subsidies 
An even more radical change in regulatory approach would be to 
eschew regulation in some cases, at least initially, in favor of 
subsidizing research into product features that reduce externalities with 
minimal impact on consumers—such as high-quality LED light bulbs or 
easy-to-use low-emissions gas can spouts. The Department of Energy, 
for example, does subsidize some such efficiency research. Advocates 
for regulation will respond that well-designed regulation is technology-
forcing, and that pressure from regulation and consumers together over 
time will result in products that meet consumer demand while also 
minimizing externalities. The success of LED light bulbs and, to some 
extent the improvement in vehicle features while emissions have 
declined, is evidence of this. For gas cans, however, manufacturers seem 
to be unable to replicate the ease of use of traditional cans, and may 
never be able to do so. To generalize, it will always be ambiguous ex 
ante whether research and development subsidization or regulation is a 
more cost-effective means to reduce externalities. In practice, regulators 
and the government usually use a mix of the two. Evidence that 
consumer-facing regulation is particularly prone to evasion and breeds 
consumer discontent (possibly undercutting the social license to 
regulate) should be considered when deciding between subsidy and 
regulation.  
Alternatively, it may be possible to explain part of the apparent 
preference (particularly in the US) for subsidy over regulation, despite 
its apparent higher cost by reference to un- or under-observed political, 
administrative, and enforcement costs of consumer-facing regulation. 
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4. Information 
In addition to subsidies, regulators have another alternative: 
information. Extensive research suggests that providing information to 
consumers about products’ environmental effects and other externalities 
leads to changes in consumer behavior. Government labeling like 
Energy Star or private labeling like that from the Forest Stewardship 
Council may be effective. Information is a major component of 
regulators’ emissions reduction strategy with road vehicles: federal 
regulators require detailed and easily-comprehensible labeling of new 
vehicles’ fuel economy.194 Regulators clearly believe such labeling will 
induce or allow consumer purchase decisions with both private (lower 
cost of ownership) and public (emissions-reducing) benefits. To be sure, 
labeling and other information strategies are unlikely to adequately 
address many externality problems alone. However, as with subsidies, 
regulators are making decisions at the margin. A regulatory program 
that looks superficially superior to an information program may not be 
so once the high evasion risk and political cost of consumer-facing 
regulation is considered.  
To be sure, it is possible for manufacturers to cheat on labeling 
requirements too—EPA’s fuel economy labels are based on 
standardized test procedures just like its emissions regulations are. But 
at least there is no incentive for producer-consumer collusion—as 
Reynaert and Sallee demonstrate for a fuel tax, if consumers still have 
freedom of choice among designs, manufacturer cheating makes 
consumers worse off. 
5. Green Defaults 
A final alternative option for regulators, suggested by Cass Sunstein 
and Lucia Reisch, are so-called “green defaults”—regulations that make 
environmentally-friendly “green” options the default for consumers, 
forcing them to actively choose dirtier “gray” options.195 This 
suggestion is an extension of Sunstein’s (and Richard Thaler’s) concept 
of policy “nudges” capitalizing on humans’ behavioral status-quo 
biases, rather than regulatory mandates or subsidies to achieve policy 
results.196 For example, Sunstein & Reisch noted that consumers in most 
 
 194. See EPA, Gasoline Vehicles: Learn More About the New Label, 
https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/label/learn-more-gasoline-label.shtml.  
 195. See Cass Sunstein and Lucia Reisch, Automatically Green: Behavioral Economics and 
Environmental Protection, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 127 (2014). 
 196. See generally RICHARD THALER AND CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS, Penguin Books (2009).  
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markets currently receive “gray” electricity generated by the lowest-cost 
mix of generation technologies (including fossil fuels) by default, but 
may often choose to instead receive “green” renewable energy from the 
grid.197 Their suggestion is to flip this default rule, providing more-
expensive “green” electricity unless consumers specifically request the 
cheaper “gray” energy.198  
“Green defaults” appear to work best when a third party—a utility, 
the government, or a contractor—is providing a service or making a 
decision. It is harder to imagine them in contexts where consumers make 
specific purchasing decisions, as they usually do for gas cans, light 
bulbs and cars. Sunstein & Reisch discussed research indicating that 
customers were more likely to adopt CFL light bulbs if they were 
presented as a default option by a contractor during a remodeling 
project.199 However, hardware stores selling individual bulbs do not, in 
most senses of the term, provide a default option for consumers. Perhaps 
regulators could require that more efficient bulbs (or low-emissions gas 
cans) be given more attractive shelf space, or perhaps the business 
model for bulbs could change to a “bulbs-as-a-service” subscription 
model, with new bulbs regularly shipped to homeowners. LED bulbs 
could then be presented as the default subscription. This would also 
have the advantage of presenting the lower lifetime costs of LED bulbs 
up front. Still, however, it is not obvious how infrequent purchases like 
gas cans could be influenced by a “green default” option. That said, 
perhaps a clever regulator would be able to come up with a better way to 
impose a “green default” than those suggested here. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Regulators often impose rules that directly affect consumers and the 
products they buy. Regulations may ban or substantially restrict sale of 
some products like incandescent light bulbs, force major design changes 
like removal of vents in gas cans, or force compromise between features 
regulators and consumers want, like vehicle emissions, cost, and 
performance. Regulators would not implement these regulations if they 
had not concluded that benefits (in these cases, environmental benefits) 
exceeded regulatory costs. There is evidence from each of these 
regulations, however, that regulatory costs are greater than they initially 
appear, and that these regulations are not as cost-effective as they appear 
on paper.  
This is for three reasons. First, many consumers appear eager to evade 
 
 197. Sunstein, supra note 195 at 134-137. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 137-138. 
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the regulations in an almost infinite variety of ways. Consumers add 
vents to new-style unvented gas cans with drills and spare parts, 
repurpose unregulated water or kerosene containers for gasoline use, and 
hoard pre-ban incandescent bulbs, to give only three examples of 
consumers’ evasive creativity. This evasion is either very difficult or 
impossible for regulators to prevent, driving up administrative costs and 
at least to some extent undercutting regulatory benefits. 
Second, consumers and producers effectively collude to avoid some 
regulations. Manufacturers may market similar but unregulated products 
to consumers, such as “utility jugs,” or may circumvent regulations with 
aftermarket modification kits, profiting from and simplifying 
consumers’ evasion attempts. Manufacturers even appear to cheat on 
regulators’ product tests, providing customers with products they prefer 
in tacit collusion. Reynaert and Sallee showed strong evidence that such 
consumer-producer collusive cheating has occurred in the European car 
market. Preventing such regulatory evasion requires regulators to 
participate in an arms race or a red queen’s game with consumers and 
producers, including ever more products within their regulatory ambit 
and improving testing regimes, only for producers and consumers to 
find new ways to evade. This, too, drives up the administrative cost of 
regulations, perhaps substantially. It also causes collateral damage, with 
“dual use” products like kerosene cans (and possibly water cans in the 
future) regulated to prevent evasion of gas can rules despite having little 
or no environmental impact when used for their intended purpose.  
Finally, many consumers resent regulation that limits their choices or 
forces design changes, apparently to a greater degree than they resent 
regulation that merely increases the cost of end products. At times, this 
discontent can be out of all proportion to the apparent inconvenience 
imposed by the regulation. Legislation largely phasing out incandescent 
light bulbs inspired significant popular backlash, despite the fact that 
replacement bulbs had a lower cost of ownership. Gas can regulations 
have inspired similar discontent, albeit at a lower profile. Paradoxically, 
however, vehicle emissions standards do not seem to have inspired 
widespread or deep consumer discontent, despite their large cost and 
large effects on vehicle design. It appears to be regulations that ban (or 
are viewed as banning) existing, familiar products that cause particular 
discontent among consumers.  
Such discontent ultimately undermines regulators’ credibility and 
political capital, again out of proportion to the predicted benefits of the 
regulation. In other words, at least some consumer-facing rules risk 
damaging regulators’ “social license to regulate” in a way that industry-
facing rules that raise costs ultimately borne by consumers do not.  
Regulators should, therefore, more carefully consider the additional 
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administrative and political costs of consumer-facing regulation. As a 
first cut, attempting to estimate these costs (or estimate them better than 
current regulators) and include them in cost-benefit analyses is likely to 
lead to better decision-making. Doing so may sometimes lead regulators 
to reject otherwise-appealing consumer-facing regulation, perhaps in 
favor of superficially more costly regulation of firms. 
However, such shifts in regulatory target are not the only option 
available to regulators. Shifting to more flexible regulatory tools such as 
performance standards and externality pricing may reduce or, in a few 
cases, eliminate consumer incentives to evade regulation or collude with 
producers to do so, and can preserve consumer choice, thereby 
preventing the most serious consumer discontent. That said, regulators 
have already moved strongly toward more flexible regulation without 
eliminating the problems with consumer-facing regulation discussed 
above.  
Other options include changing the compliance point of regulation 
(e.g., from products to fuels) or targeting aspects of products that affect 
only price, not the consumer experience (like gas can vapor permeability 
rather than spout design). More broadly, regulators should consider 
whether research and development subsidies, consumer 
information/labeling campaigns, or “green default” rules might be more 
effective than direct consumer-facing regulation. 
In short, regulators should take a broader view than they have in the 
past, and take consumers as they are, including their irrationality, 
bounded rationality, and occasional overreactions. Regulators should 
also recognize that they have limited ability to measure and appreciate 
the costs their regulations impose on consumers, who may find it more 
difficult than typical regulated firms to change their habits and 
preferences. Integrating this awareness into regulatory design choices is 
likely to lead to more better outcomes, not only in the form of more 
cost-effective regulation but also in a more secure social license to 
regulate.  
To put it as simply as possible, regulations with direct effects on 
consumers both create disproportionate political opposition and 
opportunities for consumers to evade them, sometimes in collusion with 
industry. These factors should receive greater consideration in policy 
design, likely leading to selection of different regulatory tools and/or 
targets. 
Regulation is not a goal in and of itself, but rather a means to achieve 
socially beneficial goals, such as an appropriate balance between 
environmental protection and economic growth. Where to set that 
balance is a political choice. Consumers are citizens, and it is ultimately 
they who decide what level of regulatory protection from environmental 
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or other harms they want government to supply. If regulators are 
perceived as ineffective or overbearing, citizens are likely to constrain 
or eliminate them, choosing a lesser degree of protection from 
externalities than they would ideally prefer were regulators perceived to 
be effective. Consumer-facing regulation appears to play a 
disproportionate role in citizen views on regulators, perhaps 




Richardson: Social License to Regulate: Consumer-Producer Collusion and Relat
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
